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SUMMARY OF CON11ENTS 
CHAPTER ONE Pg 1-7 
In this chapter, by way of introduction, consideration is given to the development of 
the awareness of the marine environment and the need for it to be protected from oil 
pollution. Allied to this is the development that the coastal state, which has suffered 
damage or loss as a result of oil pollution damage, is entitled to claim compensation 
.. from the owner of the vessel which caused the damage. 
1ri The next consideration is the different forms of damage that may result from pollution. 
This paper is limited to loss or damage that results from either the accidental or 
deliberate (including operational) discharge of oil froni ships. Having thus limited the 
discussion to this topic, the next area that is examined is the extent of the risk to South 
Africa from vessel source oil pollution damage. The conclusion is reached that due 
to the volume of traffic off the South African coast allied to the notoriously bad 
weather conditions and great length of coastline that may be affected by oil pollution 
damage, South Africa faces a grave risk of loss or dainage from oil pollution damage. 
A brief discussion of who should be protected from the harm follows. 
Finally, the opinion is expressed that the rights of a claimant, who has suffered oil 
poµution damage and wish to claim compensation from the ship-owner, needs to be · 
protected in South African Law. 
CHAPTER TWO Pg 8-30 
This chapter is devoted to the development of compensation for oil pollution damage 
in International Law. They purpose of this is to determine what the position of civil 
liability for oil pollution damage is in terms of International Law to determine whether 
South African Law reflects International Law. 
-2-
The starting point is to determine what the position of International Customary Law 
is in regard to oil pollution damage. The ~onclusion is drawn that although there is 
an obligation in International Customary Law that States must not allow their nationals 
to knowingly cause harm to another State, this obligation is too broad to be effective. 
The discuss~on then moves to the International Conventions which were adopted as a 
result of the inability of International Customary Law to deal with civil liability for 
oil pollution damage. 
e The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969, 
("CLC") is then analysed under the following headings: Liability, Limitation and 
Compulsory Insurance. Having examined the "CLC" under these headings, the 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 (The Fund Convention), is then 
examined with particular emphasis on the amount to which the ship-owner is entitled 
to limit his liability in the event of oil pollution damage. 
The next area to be discussed is the tanker industry initiatives to provide compensation 
for oil pollution damage. TOV ALOP and CRIST AL, which operate along similar 
e principles to the "CLC" and Fund Convention, are examined. 
The- Protocols to the "CLC" and Fund Convention are then examined. These 
Protocols are the most recent amendments to the International Law on civil liability 
for oil pollution damage and the changes to the "CLC" and Fund Convention are 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER3 Pg 31-68 
In this chapter civil liability in South African Law is examined. 
The first consideration is statutory liability in terms of the Preventing and Combatting 
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil Act (Pacoposoa) which attempted to introduce the 
provisions of the II CLC II into South African Law. The provisions of the L\.ct are 
examined in detail and the conclusion is reached that the Act does not reflect the 
"CLC II in its entirety. Furthermore, it is submitted that the Act contains a number of 
- deficiencies and anomalies which affect the position of the claimant proceeding in 
terms of the Act. 
Having concluded that there are instances where a claimant who has suffered damage 
as a result of oil pollution damage would not be entitled to proceed in terms of 
Pacoposoa, the enquiry then turns to the claimant's position to proceed in terms of the 
South African Common Law. It is concluded that the claimant can proceed in delict . 
and that in some cases it may be more advantageous for him to do so due to the ship-
owner losing his right to limit his liability. 
CHAPTER4 Pg 69-72 
\ 
This chapter contains a brief discussion of the United States regime of civil liability 
for oil pollution damage. This comparative study is to determine whether any of the 
innovations introduced into United States Law by the Federal Oil Pollution Act 1990, 
(FOPA) may be of assistance to South Africa in revamping South African statutory 
Law on civil liability for oil pollution damage. 
The conclusion is drawn that the definition of oil pollution damage as used in the 
Federal Oil Pollution· Act, if adopted in South Africa, would simplify the heads of 
damage for which the ship-owner would be liable. 
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CHAPTERS Pg 73-76 
Certain conclusions are drawn after talcing a somewhat critical look at South Africa's 
approach thus far to the incorporation of civil liability for oil pollution damage, into 
our Law and certain recommendations are made as to what amendments are required 
in South African Law to bring it into line with the International Law approach t,o civil 
liability for oil pollution damage. 
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A. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the development of the International Law of the Sea there has been a 
conflict between the notion of the freedom of the seas and their rights that a coastal 
state may exercise over the seas adjacent to its territory. This conflict stems from the 
· coastal state wanting to exploit the resources in the seas as opposed to non-coastal 
states and other states wanting to exercise the traditional rights, such as the freedom 
of navigation and fishing, that they enjoyed under the freedoip. of the seas doctrine. 
It thus developed that coastal states have certain rights within specified areas of their 
coasts. These rights extend from complete sovereignty within the internal waters of 
the state (with the exception that a coastal state cannot refuse entry to a ship in 
distress) to the exclusive right to exploit minerals found on the continental shelf of the 
coastal state1 and to exploit the resources in their exclusive economic zone. However,· 
except in regard to internal waters, the other users of the seas still retain some of the 
rights available to them under the freedom of the seas doctrine, the most important of 
which is the freedom of navigation. This freedom is not absolute, but it is limited to (-,.., innocent passage in the territorial waters,2 and it allows vessels not registered in the 
coastal state to sail within areas that the coastal state and its citizens have rights in. 
- The question that arise_s is what is the position if a vessel, not registered in the coastal 
state, infringes on the rights of the state. In traditional International Law of the Sea 
the right of recourse lay in the flag state of the vessel and if the flag state did not take 
any action then the coastal state co~ld not take any punitive measures against the 
vessel as it did not have jurisdiction over the vessel or her master. It thus developed, 
alongside the development of the coastal state's rights in regard to the different 
maritime zones, that specific enforcement jurisdiction was given to the states to 
preserve the rights that they exercised over those zones. 
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As awareness of the manne environment has increased, and more specifically 
awareness of marine pollution from whatever source, there is developing an obligation 
----~- - ~ -
on ~l userJ of_!~~ ~e~ "to protect and pres~rve the marine envjr~nment" .3 Combined 
with this obligation the coastal state has been granted extensive powers to protect the 
marine environment in the maritime zones that border their territory. 
One of the most common sources of marine pollution is the discharge of oil either ,,,,.-- ,. - - ~ --- --- - - - -·- - - ---- --· - - - - - - --- -
, deliberate!~ (included in this term throughout this paper is an operational discharge) 
· or accidentally into the seas. For many years the discharge of oil into the sea was no! 
co~~J!ed~~e -~ haz~~_as the sea was regarded as an endless garbage dump.4 
However, with the increase in the use of tankers carrying the_ oil and the subsequent 
risks in the event of a casualty, International Law of the Sea developed various 
conventions which were designed to prevent marine pollution from ships. The first 
example of this was the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the 
Seas by Oil 1954 which prohibited the discharge of oil and any oily mixture having 
an oil content of more than 100 parts per million within fifty miles of the land. 5 The 
enforcement of this convention rested with the flag state. 6 
The stranding of the "TORREY CANYON" in 1967 and the subsequent spilling of 
100 000 tons of crude oil in the sea and the resultant pollution of the coastline 
illustrated that the existing International Law of the Sea was not able to deal with the 
question of either intervening in the event of a maritime casualty to prevent oil 
pollution damage in a coastal state nor compensating the coastal state which suffered 
loss or damage resulting from pollution damage. 
To overcome the problem of the coastal state not being able to intervene in the event 
of a casualty that could result in oil pollution damage the International Community 
adopted the _International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in 
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties in 1969. In terms of article I of this convention a 
coastal state may take such measures on the High Seas that are necessary to prevent, 
mitigate or eliminate the grave or imminent danger to their coastlines or related 
interest from pollution by oil. 
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With regard to compensation for oil pollution damage, the problem areas were 
whether the coastal state had jurisdiction to try an action for compensation and more 
importantly, whether such an action was available in International Law. A further 
problem was whether the owner was entitled to limit his liability in terms of (a) the 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the 
Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels, Brussels, 1924 and (b) the 
International Convention relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of 
~eagoing Ships 1957. 
To eliminate these problems in International Law an international accord was agreed,( 
e upon in terms of which contracting states were given enforcement jurisdiction over 
vessels which were responsible for oil pollution damage in an area fifty miles from the 
contracting state's coastline. Furthermore this accord made specific provision for an 
I •• , -
action against the ship-owner for any damage resulting fr~m the discharge _of oil from 
his vessel and specified the extent to which the ship-owner was entitled to limit his 
liability for pollution damage. This accord was adopted as the International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (CLC) and was 
supplemented by the International Convention on the Establishment of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 (the Fund Convention). 
In 1981 South Africa introduced the Prevention and Combating of Pollution of the Sea"' 
by Oil Act7 (which repealed the 1971 Prevention and Combating of Pollution of the 
Sea by Oil Act - Act No 67 of 1971) which sought to enact the provisions_ of the 
"CLC" !~to_ South African municipal law and which attempts to regulate the civil 
liability of a ship-owner in the event of the discharge of oil off the South African 
~oast. The position as regards South African law on the civil liability of a ship-owner, 
in respect of oil pollution damage, will be analyzed in this paper ii:t t~rms of t4e 
)(. 
internati9nal conventions and in~ernational customary law_, in order to determi1!~4~t_ 
the international law relating to civi_l liability of the ship-owner is and to determi!}~ a~d _ 
d_iscu~s what th~ positi9I1 i.~ un~~r th_e §outh African)egal systell). The position in the 
United States (who are not party to any of the Conventions) will also be briefly 
examined to determine whether that country's regime may be of any value to South 
Africa. 
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B. WHAT IS OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE AND FORMS OF DAMAGE? 
Although there are many forms of pollution in the seas, in this paper only oil pollution 
from vessels, either accidental or deliberate, will be considered. This is because most 
of the incidents relating to pollution originate from vessels and as a result the most law 
has developed in this area. 8 Another factor to take into account is that there are only 
a limited offshore oil installations off the South African coast and as such do not pose 
the same threat as vessels carrying oil. The majority of oil pollution in the South 
African waters results from vessels. 
C. WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF THE RISK TO SOUTH AFRICA ? 
The potential threat to the South African coast from oil pollution damage is. very x 
significant as (a) South Africa has a coastline of approximately 3 000 kilometres9 and 
(b) 30 % of Middle East oil exports to America and Europe pass off the South African 
coast. 10 This in real terms means that approximately 327 million tonnes of crude oil 
are transported annually by tanker off the South African coast. 11 Coupled with this 
are the notorious weather conditions that are experienced off the coast. The tankers 
using this route are also normally too large to use the Suez Canal and thus it is mainly 
the very large crude carriers (VLCC's) that use this route and thus pose a major risk 
(' 
in the event of a casualty. 
As is evident from the recent past, South Africa bears a great risk from oil p_ollution 
. damage. Examples of tht~ ar~Jhe_f9].owi!}g: 
The "VENPET/VENOIL" incident off the South-Eastern coast in 1977 which 
resulted in approximately 30 000 tonn~s of crude oil spilling into the sea and 
causing pollution damage along the Great Brak River coastline. 
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The "CASTILLO DE BELLVER" sank off Saldanha Bay in 1983. It is 
estimated that between 160 000 and 190 000 tonnes of crude oil_ were spilled 
during the incident. It was orily due to the intervention of an unseasonal south-
easterly wind that the oil did not pollute the ecologically sensitive Langebaan 
Lagoon, but rather was blown offshore. 
The "KA TINA P" which sank off the Mozambique coast in 1992, spilling 
40 000 tonnes of crude oil, most of which drifted onto the northern Natal coast. 
The threat of pollution of the coast does not only come from oil tankers, but from 
every ship, whether large or smaU,. that passes the coast as all ships have bunker_oil 
4!}d lube oil on board that poses a significant threat. An example of this is the 
"KAIYO MARU No 1" which ran aground in 1978 on the Skeleton Coast, Namibia. 
A further risk to South Africa is from the deliberate dumping of oil from vessels 
where the tanks of the vessel are cleaned with sea water and this oily water is returned 
to the sea. Although this form of pollution causes less damage than an accidental 
spill, it is still of importance as it causes damage to the marine environment. 
Oil pollution damage need not be to the sea and sea shore only, but can also be inland. 
Inland damage occurs as a direct consequence of an oil pollution casualty where there 
is an explosion on board the vessel and the oil laden smoke drifts inland and settles. 
This occurred following the "Castillo de Bellver" casualty and extensive damage was 
caused to farmers' crops and wool harvests. 12 
D. WHO SHOULD BE PROTECTED FROM THE HARM ? 
. X 
There are many users of th_e sea an~ _the coastal shores who derive their income fro~ 
the_.sea. .SQuth Africa has rich resources of fish and an established fishing fleet. 
Further there is a developed coastal holiday industry. 
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) 
These fishermen, coastal hotel owners and coastal municipalities all have rights which 
they exercise in relation to the sea. It is these rights which are infringed when there 
is a pollution casualty and they should be entitled to recover their losses from the 
owner of the vessel that causes the damage. Furthermore, the coastal state is entitled 
to protect its environment and any expenditure that is as a result of pollution damage 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CML LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW 
In looking at compensation for oil pollution damage, the starting point is to determine 
whether or not there are any international customary law rules applying to the right 
of a stat_e, which has suffered loss as a result of marine oil pollution, to claim 
compensation from the person causing that loss. 
In terms of the arbitration in the Trail Smelter arbitration (1938 - 1941) it was held 
' 
that "no state had the right to use or permit use of its territory in such a manner to 
cause an injury in or to the territory of another state". 13 The question that arose 
· following this dictum was whether or not a vessel not flagged in the coastal state 
· where the damage occurred could be held liable for oil pollution damage to either the 
state or an individual in that state. In the Corfu Channel case (1949) the International 
Court of Justice held that "each state was under an obligation not to allow knowingly 
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states". 14 This principle 
of international customary law has been adopted in the 1958 Geneva High Seas 
Convention Article 2 which states that "states must exercise the freedom of the high 
seas with reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their exercise of the 
freedom of the high seas" .15 This has been taken over into the 1982 Law of the Seas 
Convention Article 192.16 
As is evident from the above, there is a general provision in international customary 
law "that states must not permit their nationals to discharge into the sea matter that 
could cause harm to nationals of other states" .17 However, due to the particular 
nature of international customary law, in that "it is based on the actual practices of 
states in a given area of activity which are common throughout the international 
community, so that they are accepted as having the force of law" 18 there is no 
particular way of enforcing these rules of international customary law. 
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Thus, for example, if a state suffers loss due to the casualty of a vessel that is not 
flagged in that state, and the loss occurred outside the territorial waters of the state 
' 
it will have to proceed against the wrongdoer in the courts of the state where the 
vessel is flagged. Here the claimant may encounter problems in that firstly the 
vessel's flag state may not have made provision in their municipal law for the 
enforcement of the international customary law rule and secondly he will have to 
prove fault on the part of the vessel's owners. Thus the injured party may have the 
right to claim in terms of international customary law but he has no way of enforcing 
that right. 
A further problem relying upon international customary law is that the rule upon 
which one would have to base the claim, is too broad to be effective. In the modern 
day transportation of oil and the attendant hazards thereto, there need to be detailed 
provisions of the exact legal regime that will apply when there is a loss caused by oil 
pollution. More importantly, the law relating to the enforcement right of the state 
which is claiming compensation as a result of loss suffered by oil pollution, needs to 
be modified. 
B. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
Due to the inability of international customary law to deal with compensation of states 
which had suffered loss as a result of oil pollution damage, as was exemplified after 
the "TORREY CANYON" stranding off the coast of Great Britain in 1967, the 
International community decided that the deficiencies in international customary law 
needed to be filled. These deficiencies were filled by adopting a Convention that 
attempted to regulate the position of a claimant who had suffered loss as a result of 
oil pollution damage and wished to claim compensation for that loss. This convention 
was the "CLC". 
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The "CLC" was adopted at a conference in Brussels in 1969 but only came into force 
in 1975. 19 The "CLC" was later supplemented by the "Fund Convention" in 197120 
and further amended by Protocols in 1976 and 1984.21 
I. THE "CLC" 
a. 
The "CLC" will be analyzed by looking at the following: 
a. Liability 
b. Limitation 
c. . Compulsory Insurance 
LIABILITY 
Article III (1) of "CLC" introduced the most innovative feature of the 
convention. The article provides: 
"Except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, 
the owner of a ship at the time of an incident, or where 
the incident consists of a series of occurrences at the time 
of the first such occurrence, shall be liable for any 
pollution damage caused by oil which has escaped or been 
discharged from the ship as a result of the incident". 22 
x.Thus the convention introduces the concept of strict liability on the.part of the 
ship-owner for any pollution damage caused by the discharge of oil from his 
ship. This means that a claimant who has suffered loss no longer has to prove 
negligence on the part of the owner of the ship, which had been difficult to 
prove, to bring a successful action against the owner. 
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Although the concept of strict liability is absolute in the "CLC" the application 
of the convention is not as broad as it seems at first glance. There are three 
express €~to the rule relating to strict liability and there are further 
limitations relating to the applicability of the convention that will exclude the 
operation of the principle of strict liability. 
The first exception to the operation of strict liability is that the owner of a ship 
shall not be liable for pollution damage that "resulted from an act of war, 
hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, 
inevitable and irresistible character". 23 This exception is based upon the 
principle that as the convention provides for comp_ulsory insurance it is 
equitable that the areas that are excluded from insurance cover should also be 
excluded from strict liability. 24 
The second exception where the ship-owner will not be held strictly liable is 
where the damage "was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent 
to cause damage by a third party" .25 For the owner to avoid liability based 
upon this exception he would have to prove that the damage was wholly caused 
by the act or omission of the third party. If for example, there was the threat 
of discharge of oil from the ship due to the act of a third party and the coastal 
state took action to prevent the discharge and this action resulted in pollution 
damage, the ship-owner will not be able to rely on this exception as the damage 
was not caused wholly by the act of a third party with the intent to cause 
damage. However the ship-owner would have a right of recourse against the 
coastal state if he can est,ablish negligence on their part. 26 
The third exception is where the damage "was wholly caused by the negligence 
or other wrongful act of any Government or other authority responsible for the 
maintenance of lights or other navigational aids in the exercise of that 
function" . 27 
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For the ship-owner to rely upon this exception he would have to prove that the 
damage was wholly caused by the failure to maintain the navigational aids or 
lights. As is evident this is a very limited exception as the onus is upon the 
owner to show that the damage resulted wholly from the non-maintenance and 
not from any other contributing factors. 
As has been indicated above, Article 111(1) introduces the concept of strict 
liability into the convention. However, the wording of the Article is of great 
importance as in terms of Article I (the definition article) certain of the words 
used in Article III have a very specific meaning which limits their application 
and thus the convention appreciably. 
In terms of Article III the owner of the ship is liable for any pollution damage 
caused by oil. Article I states that "for the purpose of this convention _ship 
means any sea-going vessel and ariy seaborne craft of any type whatsoever, 
actually carrying oil in bulk as a cargo" .28 Thus the essential requirement for 
the operation of the "CLC" is that the ship is carrying oil in bulk as a cargo. 
If a tanker goes aground whilst on a ballast voyage the subsequent damage will 
not fall within the convention. Further if the ship in question is not a vessel .that 
carries oil in bulk as a cargo then the convention does not apply. This means 
that the majority of vessels that ply the oceans do not fall within the 
convention. Another problem that the convention fails to address is the question 
of off-shore oil rigs. The "IXTOC I" blow-out off Mexico spewed 30 000 
barrels a day for a period of four months in 198929 but due to the definition of 
a ship was not subject to the "CLC". 
, A furt~er _limitation in the convention is the definition of pollution damage. 
• 
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This is defined as: 
"loss or damage caused outside the ship carrying oil by 
\ 
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil 
from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may 
occur, and includes the costs of preventive measures and 
further loss or damage caused by preventive measures" . 30 
For the damage to be recoverable under the "CLC" the loss or damage must 
be from contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the 
ship. Thus if there has been an explosion on board the ship which causes the 
oil to ignite and damage by soot and smoke results from this, it is submitted 
that the damage is not caused by contamination resulting from the escape or 
discharge of oil from the ship and thus would not be subject to the "CLC". 
A further problem with the definition of oil pollution damage is that it is limited 
to the defined words. Article 1(6) is introduced with the word "means" and 
thus pollution damage is confined to the words described in Article 1(6). The 
question that arises is ~h_ether_pur_e econom_ic l~-~~ situations are covered by the 
definition contained in Article I. The definition does not give any guideline as 
to whether it includes pure economic loss or not, as it is wide enough to cover 
pure economic loss if interpreted broadly, but due to the problems of limiting 
the scope of potential claims it has been argued that it allows as recoverable, 
economic losses those suffered by persons who depend directly on the earnings 
from coastal or sea-related activities.31 
The question of preventive measures is also of importance as the definition 
contained in the convention further limits the type of costs that can be claimed. 
In terms of Article 1 (7) preventive measures are any reasonable measures taken 
after an incident. 
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1 Article 1 (8) defines an incident." as any occurrence ...... which causes pollution 
damage". Thus preventive measures taken that were successful i.e. that no oil 
spilt then in terms of these definitions these costs could not be claimed against 
the "CLC". 
Article IX provides that where pollution damage has been caused in the 
territory of one or more contracting states then an action for compensation may 
only be brought in the courts of that contracting state. Thus in terms of the 
convention a plaintiff is limited to instituting action within his own state. 31a 
Article II limits the application of the "CLC" to pollution damage caused on the 
territory, including the territorial sea and to preventive measures taken to 
prevent or minimize such loss. Thus only damage caused within 12 nautic~ 
miles will be compensated by the "CLC." but the costs of preventive measures 
taken outside this area will be compensated. This submission is based upon the 
interpretation of the wording of Article II. In terms of Article II the pollution 
damage must result on the territory (including the territorial waters) but there 
is no such geographical limitation on the preventive measures taken to prevent 
or minimise the damage. Thus the fisherman who relies upon the fish found 
beyond the territorial sea, if he sufferers pollution damage as defined outside 
the territorial sea will not be able to claim this damage even if it occurs 12.5 
miles off the low water mark whilst the state if it took preventive measures in 
this area will be able to claim compensation. 
If the claimant does not bring his action within three years from the date of the 
damage occurred then his right of action has prescribed. 31h A further 
limitation is that the action must be commenced within six years from the date 
of the incident and if the damage results from a series of incidents then six 
years from the date of the first incident. 31c This limitation can be of great 
importance where there has been a casualty which resulted in oil pollution 
damage which has sunk still containing oil. 
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If there is a subsequent spillage as the ship rusts over the years the prescription 
period can be of vital importance to the success of the claimant in bringing his 
claim under the "CLC". 
Article XI further limits the operation of the convention as it excludes all 
""' ' 
warships and State owned ship used for non-commercial purposes. 
b. LIMITATION 
A ship-owner has always been entitled, by conyention, 32 to limit his liability ~1:1 
fs!~J)ect of damage done by hi§_s_h_ip.33 
This right to limit the liability of a ship-owner was incorporated into the "CLC" 
and it enables the owner to limit his liability to a specified maximum amount 
determined by the size of his ship. 
Article V provides that: 
"the owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability 
under this convention in respect of one incident to an 
aggregate amount of 2 000 francs for each ton of the 
ship's tonnage. However, this aggregate amount shall not 
in any event exceed 210 million francs" .34 
This means that an owner of a ship that has caused oil pollution damage as 
defined in Article 1(6) is liable for damages amounting to approximately US 
$132 per ton, with an aggregate amount of approximately US $14 million as 
his maximum liability. 35 (Limitation is discussed in greater depth at pg 43 
below) The ship-owner constitutes a fund36 from which all claims for pollution 
damage are claimed. These include the costs of preventive measures and clean 
up costs.37 This fund represents the ship-owner's total liability for pollution 
damage from one incident and no one who has suffered any loss can bring any 
further action against the owner. 38 
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The only exception to Article V is where the incident occurred as a result of 
the actual fault or privity of the owner. In this instance the owner is. not 
entitled to limit his liability and is liable for the full extent of the pollution · 
damage. 39 
This concept of non-limitation for pollution damage which occurred as a result 
of the fault or privity of the owner has been taken over into the latest limitation 
convention. Article 3(b) of the 1976 London Convention on Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims provides that the convention does not apply to 
claims for oil pollution damage within the meaning of the "CLC" and thus the 
owner upon whose fault or privity the damage occurred will not be entitled to 
raise limitation in terms of the 1976 Limitation Convention as the damage is 
pollution damage as defined in the "CLC" and is excluded from the ambit of 
the Limitation Convention. 
It is important to note that it is only the owner that is entitled to limit his 
liability and further that the right to limit liability is only lost when the damag-~ 
o_scurs with the fault or privity .of th~ owner. Thus if the ship is on demise 
charter and there is an incident which results in pollution damage it is the 
owner of the ship that will be held strictly liable and it is the owner from whom 
the damages must be claimed in terms of the convention. If there was fault on 
the part of the charterer this is not sufficient to deprive the owner of his right 
to limit his liability in terms of the convention as the convention requires that 
it was the owner himself that was at fault. 
What constitutes actual fault or privity is a question for the court seized with 
the matter to determine but as the words are the same as those used in the 1957 
Limitation Convention,39(a) it is submitted that they will be given the same 
meaning. The owner must show that he took all reasonable steps to ensure thj 
[ 
efficient manageme~t and safe navigation of the ship. 39(b> This question is 
essentially one of fact, to be determined objectively. 39<c> 
• 
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c. COMPULSORY INSURANCE 
To prevent the problem of a plaintiff having a claim against the owner of a ship 
for pollution damage but the owner of the ship not being able to pay the 
amount claimed, the "CLC" introduced the requirement that_ every ship, which_ 
c~rried more than 2 000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo, had t~,E~e_ jnsur~nce or 
~ty to cover his maximum liability in terms of Article V. 40 • The ship is 
required to have a certificate indicating that it has the required security. To 
enforce this requirement Contracting States flag states are given the powers to 
prevent a ship from trading unless it has a certificate. 41 Contracting States are 
given powers to introduce municipal legislation to prevent a ship carrying more 
than 2 000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo from entering or leaving its ports 
without this certificate.42 , This provision extends to ships wherever they are 
registered43 and thus the provisions of the "CLC" regarding the requirement of 
a certificate of insurance can be extended to vessels which are registered in a 
non-contr;4cting state. 
II. THE FUND CONVENTION 
It_ soon became apparent that the compensation p~yable iri_ terms of the "CLC" was not 
adequate or that in circumstances where compensation was not payable in terms of 
"CLC" supplementary compensation was required:44 The question that arose was 
who was to be liable for this additional amount that was to be paid out. In terms of 
11 CLC 11 the ship-owner is strictly liable for any pollution damage. However many 
ship-owners felt that the cargo owner should also bear part of the costs for pollution 
damage as it was their cargo that contributed to the damage. This is illustrated by the 
fact that in terms of the "Fund Convention" (as will be discussed below) the cargo 
owners have to contribute to the fund from which compensation is paid. It was to 
rectify these areas that the "Fund Corivention" was introduced. 
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All members of the "CLC" are not members of the "Fund Convention" but all 
members of the "Fund Convention" must be members of the "CLC" as the Fund 
operates as a top-up fund to the "CLC". - -··~ -
Article 4 of the convention provides that the "Fund Convention" will pay 
compensation for oil pollution damage ( oil pollution damage having the same meaning 
in this convention as in the "CLC "45) in the following ~ircumstances_: 
1. Where no liability arises under the liability convention. 
2. Where the owner who is liable for pollution damage under "CLC" is incapable 
of meeting his financial obligation arising out of the damage or that the cover 
provided for in terms of Article V of "CLC" is insufficient to cover the full 
extent of the pollution damage. 
3. Where the damage exceeds the owner's limited liability in terms of Article V 
(1) of "CLC". 
The plaintiff is thus covered for damages arising from circumstances in which the 
ship-owner would be entitled to avoid liability in terms of 
"CLC". He is further protected from the situation where there are a myriad of claims 
against the fund constituted by the ship-owner in terms of Article V of the "CLC" and 
these claims are proportioned against the fund.In terms of the "Fund Convention" he 
is entitled to recover the full extent of his damages. 
The "Fund Convention" provides that the fund will not be liable if the pollution 
damage results from an act of war, hostilities, civil war or resulted from the escape 
or discharge of oil from a warship or a ship owned by a state and used for non-, 
commercial purposes.46 A claimant must also be able to identify the ship which 
caused the damage47 to have a claim against the fund. 
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The fund is also subject to a limitation of liability and the maximum liability of the 
fund in respect of one incident is 450 million francs. 48 • However this amount includes 
the amount paid out under the "CLC" and it is thus an _!gg_!~g~te amount that is 
payable in terms of both conventions.49 
The fund is financed through contributions from oil importers. Any person who 
imports more than 150 000 tons of crude oil or fuel oil into the territory of the 
contracting state in a calendar year is required to make a compulsory contribution to 
the fund. 50 
It is through these contributions that the cargo owners bear a portion of liability that 
results from oil pollution damage. 
A further way in which the cargo owners contribute to the payment of oil pollution 
. damages is through the fund indemnifying the ship-owner or insurer who has incurred 
liability under the "CLC" to an amount of 1 500 francs per ton for each ton of the 
ship's tonnage or to an amount of 125 million francs whichever is the less.51 The 
fund will not compensate the owner if the pollution damage results from the wilful 
misconduct of the owner himself:52 or if the damage resulted from the fault or privity 
of the owner in that the shiP. did not comp.!y with specified international conventions. 53 
The "Fund Convention" thus supplements the "CLC" and attempts to spread the load 
of the strict liability provisions in the conventions between the ship-owner on the one 
hand and the cargo owners on the other. It also enables a claimant to claim a greater 
extent of his loss from either the ship-owner or the fund and covers the instance where 
the ship-owner in terms of the "CLC" would not be liable for the damage. 
III. THE TANKER INDUSTRY AGREE1\1ENTS 
Due to the increasing numbers of tankers and their size, the threat from both 
deliberate and accidental oil spills increased. 
Page 20 
As has been shown above, the international community attempted to regulate and 
protect the marine environment from harm by holding a ship-owner strictly liable for 
any pollution damage that escaped from his ship. However, prior to the introduction 
of the II CLC II a group of tanker owners introduced a scheme whereby they voluntarily 
offered compensation to a national government in the event of an oil spill.54 This 
agreement was called the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability 
for Oil Pollution55 but is better known by its acronym TOV ALOP. 
TOVALOP was initially only introduced to cover a national government's clean up 
costs after a spill and was limited to US $100 per ton to a maximum of 
US $10 million. 56 A further requirement for liability was · that there must be 
negligence on the part of the tanker owner, but in terms of clause IV (B) of the 1969 
version of TOVALOP the owner was presumed to be negligent. 
As TOVALOP stood in its 1969 guise it was of no benefit to an individual who had 
suffered loss or damage as a result of an oil sl&ll as it only com2ensated national 
governments for expenses that they had reasonably incurred as a result of an oil spill 
.by one of their members.56<a> The 11 CLC 11 came into force in 1975 and although 
ratified by many states57 there were still states that had not adopted it and the tanker 
industry felt that in these areas there needed to be some form of compensation for 
those who had suffered loss as a result of pollution damage. 58 TOV ALOP was thus 
revised in 1978 to give effect to these principles. 
The most important change to TOV ALOP was that the tanker owner (including a 
bareboat charterer) undertakes, voluntarily and as promptly as possible to dispose of 
all valid claims arising against him under the TOVALOP Agreement irrespective of 
fault. 59 These claims are in respect of any persons who have sustained pollution 
damage. 60 The agreement thus moves away from only government clean up costs. as 
the definition of yersons includes governments, individuals and other entities.61 
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TOVALOP does not apply where the 11 CLC 11 applies62 as in terms of Clause IV of 
TOV ALOP, liability will not be assumed by the TOV ALOP fund if the damage is 
covered by Article III (2) of II CLC 11 • Thus if the damage would be covered by the 
provisions of the 11 CLC 11 , the claimant cannot approach TOVALOP for compensation. 
The definition of oil pollution damage in TOVALOP is the same as in the "CLC" but 
it allows the costs of preventive measures taken to avoid pollution damage to be 
claimed.63 
The definition of a tanker in TOVALOP differs from that of a ship in the 11 CLC 11 in 
that it covers any sea-going vessel designed and constructed for carrying <?il in bulk 
as cargo whether or not it is actually so carrying oil. 64 Thu_s the provisions of the 
agreement are applicable to a tanker in ballast as well as to a tanker actually carrying 
oil as a cargo. 
Under TOV ALOP the owner is entitled to limit his liability in accordance with the 
tonnage of his vessel. The maximum compensation available under TOV ALOP is US 
$16.8 million. 65 
As is evident the provisions of the 1978 TOV ALOP Agreement are a very useful way 
in which to claim compensation for oil pollution damage where the provisions of the 
"CLC" are not applicable. It also gives the claimant the opportunity to claim the full 
extent of his losses if part of his loss falls within the II CLC II whilst the other portion 
can be claimed under TOVALOP. An example of this is where the ship is under 
bareboat charter and the loss results from the negligence of the charterer. The 
claimant can proceed against the owner of the ship in terms of the II CLC II and if he 
does not recover the full extent of his loss then he can proceed against the charterer 
in terms of TOV ALOP. 
However the effect of inflation has meant that the limits available under TOV ALOP 
do not adequately compensate a claimant and thus in 1986 the TOV ALOP Agreement 
was revised to increase the amount of compensation available under the agreement. 
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A supplement has been introduced whereby if the tanker causing the damage is 
carrying a CRISTAL (discussed below) owned cargo, then a supplementary 
compensation scheme is available up to a maximum of US $70 million. 66 Thus if the 
cargo carried is a non-CRISTAL cargo the maximum liability remains at US $16.8 
million. 
To date approximately 98 % of the world tanker tonnage is entered in TOV ALOP67 and 
thus a claimant whose claim falls within the provisions of the agreement is in a strong 
position to recover the full extent of his loss without having to resort to litigation as 
the agreement provides for arbitration in the event of a dispute. 68 
A second agreement that the tanker industry introduced relating to compensation for 
oil pollution damage was the Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker 
. Liability for Oil Pollution, 69 better known by its acronym CRIST AL. The purpose of 
CRISTAL was to provide a top-up to the compensation available under TOV ALOP. 
For CRISTAL to apply the oil spilled must be owned by a CRISTAL member and the 
ship from which it escaped must be a party to TOV ALOP. 70 
CRISTAL's liability is US $30 million per incident.71 
The limit of 
In 1978 CRISTAL was revised for the same reasons as TOVALOP and substantial 
revisions were made to the agreement. The basic requirement of ownership of the oil 
by a CRIST AL party and that the ship is owned or bareboat chartered by a 
TOV ALOP member remains. 72 The maximum liability of the agreement was 
increased up to US $36 million. 73 This amount is available where third persons 
cannot collect in full from "CLC" or TOVALOP, however it does not apply if the 
"Fund Convention" is applicable. 74 
CRISTAL was also amended in 1986. The major amendment was that the cargo had 
to be owned by a member of CRIST AL but the ship did not have to be owned or 
bareboat chartered by a member of TOV ALOP. 75 A further amendment was that the 
maximum compensation payable under the agreement was increased to US 
$135 million per incident. 76 
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The agreements provide another important avenue in which a claimant can recover 
loss caused by oil pollution damage where the "CLC"or "Fund Convention" do not 
apply. 
IV. THE PROTOCOLS 
The stranding of the "AMOCO CADIZ~ off the coast of Brittany in 1978 and the 
subsequent pollution damage to the coast of France had the same effect on 
international law relating to liability for oil pollution as the "TORREY CANYON" 
had in 1969. The costs of preventive measures and clean-:up costs exceeded the 
maximum limit of the "CLC" but also exceeded the TOVALOP limit. 77 It was evident 
that the limit of liability available under the "CLC" as it stood was inadequate and 
further that the "Fund Convention" was contributing more towards clean-up costs and 
compensation than it was intended. 78 
In an attempt to resolve the problem of the limitation available under "CLC" two 
protocols were adopted in 1984 that altered the provisions of the "CLC" and the 
"Fund Convention". The most imp(?rtant features of these protocols will be discussed. 
The first area that needs to be looked at is the question of liability. As has already 
been discussed the ship-owner is held strictly liable for any pollution damage caused 
by his ship in terms of the "CLC". This principle is maintained in the Protocol 
relating to the "CLC" but an integral part of this strict liability is the ship-owner's 
ability to limit his liability in terms of Article V of "CLC". However, in terms of 
Article. V (2) of "CLC" the ship-owner loses his right to limit his liability if the loss 
results from his fault or privity. In this instance the ship-owner is then responsible 
for the full extent of the loss. In the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the 
Protocol the argument was raised that the compensation limits could not be raised 
unless the provisions regarding the owner's loss of the right to limit his liability were 
altered. 79 This argument was successful and the Protocol revised the "CLC" in that 
( ~ an owner only loses his ~ght to limit his liability: 
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"if the damage resulted from his personal act or omission, committed 
with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with the 
knowledge that such damage would probably result" 80 
With the ship-owner's interests protected the question of the increase in the limit of 
liability was addressed. In terms of Article 6 (1) of the "CLC" Protocol the owner 
may limit his liability in respect of one incident !O 3 million units of account for a_fil!i.R. 
not exceeding 5 000 tons and for a ship in excess. of this tonnage 420 units of account 
for each ton subject to a maximum amount of 59. 7 million units of !CCmmt. The unit 
of account in the Protocol is a special drawing right or a SDR. The maximum J 
liability under the "CLC" is thus US $60.8 million. 81 The ma~mum liability in terms \ 
of the "Fund Convention" Protocol has also been raised to 135 million units of J 
account of approximately US $138 million. 82 
l!) The second area of the "CLC" Protocol that requires attention is the provisions that 
introduced significant changes to the sco~ of application of the convention. These 
· ~~\: P\~ P,l\Q, 
include a new . definition of a ship, a new definition o( pollution damage and an 
extension of the territorial application of the conventioJ:1.D 
The conference recognised that, apart from the spectacular incidents that result from 
the stranding or sinking of a tanker, the majority of oil spilt into the seas result from 
operational discharges from ships through the washing of their slop tanks. According 
to the definition of a ship contained in "CLC" the convention only applies when the 
• 
vessel is actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo. The Protocol now defines a ship as: 
"any sea-gomg vessel and sea-borne craft of any type whatsoever 
constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, provided 
that a ship capable of carrying oil and · other cargoes shall be regarded 
as a ship only when it is actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and 
during any voyage following such carriage unless it is proved that it has 
no residues of such carriage of oil in bulk on board". 83 
....... 
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Thus the owner of a ship whether a . tanker or a combination carrier will be held 
strictly liable for any damage resulting from the residues carried on the subsequent 
voyage after the carriage of the oil cargo i.e. this applies when the cargo of oil has 
been discharged and the vessel is either in ballast or carrying another cargo. 
The Protocol amended the problem area of what constituted pollution damage. Under 
the "CLC", as has been discussed above, 84 there is a question as to what damages may 
be claimed from the ship-owner. The Protocol attempts to define more specifically 
what cpnstitutes pollution damage. In terms of Article 2(3) of the Protocol the 
definition contained in Article 1(6) of "CLC" is amended. The new definition of 
pollution damage is as follows: 
X "(a) the loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination 
resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, 
wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided that 
compensation for impairment of the environment other than foss 
of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of 
reasonable measures of reinstatement actually taken or to be 
taken; 
Y.. (b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage 
caused by preventive measures." 
The definition limits a claim in respect of · the environment .!o the costs actually 
• incurred or to be incurred in restoring it to its~~re-dalJ!~~ cond~ion. 85 The proviso 
"qJher t_!ian loss of profit from such imQairment" indicate~ that loss of profit from the 
impairment to the environment is now without dou~t a cgf!!P,etent head of damage 
under the "CLC" Protocol. However, in applying this provision the questions of 
remoteness of damage and causation will have a limiting function on what at first 
glance seems to be a very wide provision. 
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The question of preventive measures taken to avoid pollution damage has also been 
clarified by the Protocol. As we have seen86 in terms of the definitions of incident and 
preventive measures in "CLC", measures taken prior to the discharge of oil were not 
claimable in terms of "CLC". 
This anomaly has been removed in the Protocol by the introduction of a new definition 
of incident which states that "an incident is an occurrence ..... which causes pollution 
damage or creates a grave and imminent threat of causing such damage". 87 Thus any 
· preventive measures taken to avoid pollution damage are now claimable against the 
owner as long as the threat of pollution damage is grave and imminent. 
Due to the coastal state having acquired varying rights in international law over their 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) there were strong calls for the provisions of the 
"CLC" to be made applicable to the EEZ.88 This proposal was adopted and the 
"CLC" will now apply to the EEZ. 89 
The Protocols have amended and clarified certain aspects of the international law 
relating to liability for oil pollution damage and have attempted to raise the limits of 
liability to . realistic limits to take into account the increase in size of vessels 
transporting oil and the increased value of the cargo. However it must be stressed that 
the Protocols have not come into force as the "CLC" Protocol requires ratification by 
ten states, including six states each with a gross tonnage of not less than one million 
units of tanker tonnage. To date only eight countries have ratified the Protocol. 90 The 
Fund Protocol requires ratification by at least eight states who receive at least 600 
million contributing tonnes. 91 As neither of these Protocols is yet in force the current 
position is that the 1969 "CLC" and the 1971 "Fund Convention" are still in force and 
regulate the international law position as regards damage resulting from oil pollution. 
. -
Having looked at the position of a claimant for oil pollution damage in international 
law and the attendant problems thereto the question that needs to be answered is what 
is the position of the claimant under South African law. Coupled with this inquiry is 
the question of whether South Africa is comp.l);'.ing with the obligations imposed on i~ 
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CHAPTER THREE -
CIVIL LIABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
Sout~--~~c~~pc~9ed to the . "C!,c;.~• _o~. !Z_~~£1!J27 6.: I~_e_2rovi~_lQ_1!~~9J the ".CLC" 
were published for general information in Governm7~t Gazette:N_o_ 5867 of27 January 
.1978. However, it was not until the introduction of the Prevention and Comb~,!in[__~! 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil Act92 (Pacoposoa or the Act) that the provisions of 
international law, as reflected in the "CLC", relating to compensation for oil pollution 
damage were introduced to South Africa. The first section of this chapter will deal 
with the provisions of Pacoposoa relating to the civil liability of a ship-owner in South 
9 African law. The second portion of this chapter will deal with the position of an, 
individual who has suffered damage as a result of oil pollution that is not covered by 
the provisions of Pacoposoa. 
Although South Africa is a party to the "CLC", it has not adopted the "Fund 
Convention" as the procedure whereby__m,onies are collected for the Fund requires the 
contracting state to declare their oil imports and the owner thereof. 93 Due to the oil 
embargo on South Africa there is a reluctance to declare the extent of oil imp9rts. 
Thus South Africa has only acceded to the provisions of the "CLC". 
e South Africa has ratified the 1984 Protocol to the "CLC" 94 but to date has not 
introduced the provisions of the Protocol into South African municipal law. 
A. STATUTORY LIABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA (PACOPOSOA) 
The act will be analyzed by looking at the following: 
a. Liability 
b. Limitation 
c. Compulsory Insurance and related topics 
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.d. Jurisdiction of the Court 
e. Causality - This will be discussed below94<a> when examining South African 
Common Law 
a. LIABILITY 
Section 9(1) of the Act introduces the concept of strict liabilitl into South African law. 
The section provides: 
"Subject to the provisions of this Act the owner of any ship, tanker or 
offshore installation shall be liable for ... " 
The word "shall" has been interpreted by South African Courts to mean that no mens 
rea is · required and thus no intention or negligence needs to be proved by the 
cl~mant. 95 The liability is therefore, it is submitted, strict. This submission is further 
strengthened by the provision of Section 9(5) which entitles a ship-owner to limit his 
liability where the damage resulted from an incident that was not caused by the fault 
of the owner. The conclusion to be drawn from this provision is that, if the owner 
were not held strictly liable for any damage in terms of Section 9(l)(a), the provisions 
relating to his ability to·limit his liability without being at fault, would be meaningless. 
e Thus to bring about a claim in terms of Pacoposoa for loss or damage resulting from 
pollution damage, th~ claimant only needs to fall within the provisions of the section 
for his claim to be successful. 
The question that needs to be answered is in what circumstances the ship-owner would 
be held strictly liable. The first instance is for I' any loss or damage caused, elsewhere 
I 
than on such ship, tanker or offshore installation, in the area of the Rei2ublic b__y 
pollution resulting from the discharge of oil from such s_hip_, tanker or off~ho,re, 
installation" .96 This section is of great importance as it limits the scope of application 
of the Act to the events described in the section. 
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• 1 The first lilllitatio_n in the section is that strict liability only attaches to the ship-owner 
if the lo~~ .. or damage results from a discharge 1!om_ a_ ship,_ ta~~~ -~r_off~~~re 
inst~~~n. A ship is defined as "any kind of vessel or other sea-borne object from 
which oil can be discharged, excluding a tanker". 97 
Thus t~~- ~-~~- a~plJ_~~ .. !? -~ny_~~-~s~J, excJ{!ding a -~*~'· J!om which oil can be 
discharged. Oil is defined in the Act as "any kind of mineral oil and includes spirit 
produced from oil and a mixture of such oil and water". 98 Having regard to the 
definition of a ship and that of oil, it is submitted that the Act is applicable where the 
damage results from oil from the bunkers of a ship not actually carrying oil in bulk 
e as a cargo. In terms of the definition the -~ct is only aPPlicable to sea-going vessels. 
This provision relating to a ship is far wider than that_ under_ th~_" C:1C" _;.i_~ Jh.~ 
" -. c,~--•-.--w•· .... ,~, ~••-•.-=c_- ~~-~--,._~,.....,--,~----•-----=•~ ---~ •~ =--=--~-•-'-"-'" -•--• -----~---------- -- -
~rovisions of th~--"-~~C", as we_ h_ave_ seen, ?nl_y apply to ships actually carrying <?_i~ 
in bulk as cargo. The Protocol extends the provisions of the "CLC" to tankers and 
~- - ,,.-~-~ .. -~ .. 
other oil carriers whilst on ballast voyages after carrying oil as cargo but does not 
extend to any other class of ships. 
A tanker is defined as "a!)y_s~~KajQg_~~~-sel of"._ a~y type whatsoever, actually carrying 
oil in._~u!~ .. as c~~o and_ in respec!~2Lwhich the pr()yi_si9ns _ _9f_Jb~~ Conyention are 
applicable" .99 This is a similar de_finit~o11to_ that _~ont~ned in the _"CLCII andi_~, it is, 
e subJP:iUed, of similar inte~retation in South African law. For the owner of a tanker 
to be held strictly liable in South African law, the claimant would have to show that 
the damage resulted from the tanker as defined, ie that the tanker was actually 
carrying oil in bulk as cargo at the time that the loss or damage occurred. Thus if the 
tanker was on_ a ballast voyage and loss or damage resulted from a discharg~ of oila_s 
defined, t~-~ o~~e:_ ~f ~t~~ _ta11k~ -~ould not incur strict liability. This is an anom~y 
in Pacoposoa as shi_p_s. o~. ballast yoyages fall with_in the Act, but tankers, which 
constituteJg~~~er ~~r~at,_ do not A further problem with the definition of a tanker 
are the words "in respect of which the provisions of the Convention are applicable" 
when used in connection with a tanker. 
) 
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This limitation on the applicability of the Act to tankers which are only subject to 
11 CLC 11 , severely affects the effectiveness of Pacoposoa and the relief available to the 
State and an individual who has suffered loss resulting from oil pollution. This is 
another anomaly in the Act as the Act is applicable to all ships irrespective of their 
flag state nationality. 
An offshore installation is defined as "a facility ... which is used for the transfer of 
oil to land ... and includes any exploration platform or production platform". 100 Here 
too the Act goes beyond the "CLC" as any pollution damage from an oil rig or an oil 
reception point falls within the provisions of the Act, but in international law would 
e not be subject to the provisions of the "CLC". 
0~ The second area of limitation within Section 9(l)(a) is the wording "within the area 
of the Republic". This is defined to include the territorial waters of the Republic. 101 
Section 2 of the Territorial Waters Act102 states that the territorial waters of the 
Republic are twelve nautical miles from the low-water mark. Pacoeosoa is thus 
applicable to any dama~..c..c_ur_s_on land and within twelve nautical miles of th~ . 
land. 
\1_)D The third area that needs to be looked at is the requirement that the loss or damag£_ 
e results from the discharge of oil. This causal requirement is of great importance as it 
limits the application of Pacoposoa. Discharge means: 
"any discharge of oil from a ship or a tanker or an offshore installation 
into a part of the sea which is a prohibited area and includes any 
escapmg, spilling, leaking, pumping or dumping of oil from such 
ship". 103 
The first requirement for any oil spillage to fall within the definition of discharge is 
that the oil must be discharged into a part of the sea which is prqhibited. The sea is 
defined as the water and the bed of the sea. 104 
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Thus if there is an explosion and fire on board the vessel and oil laden smoke causes 
damage on the land, as happened on the Cape West coast after the "CASTILLO DE 
BELL VER" casualty, this would not subject the owner to strict liability as the oil was 
not discharged into the sea as required for it to be a discharge as defined. The second 
requirement of the definition of a discharge is that the oil is. discharged into a part of 
the sea that is prohibited. 
The prohibited area is a distance of fifty nautical miles from the low-water mark. 105 
Thus if the discharge occurred more than fifty miles from the land and there was 
subsequent damage in the Republic as defined in Pacoposoa, this damage would not 
be recoverable in terms of Pacoposoa as the damage did not result from a discharge 
as required by Section 9(l)(a). An example of this is the recent sinking of the tanker 
"KA TINA P" in the Mozambique Channel. As a result of the sinking, a large quantity 
of oil was spilt into the Channel. Due to the currents, this oil was washed up on the 
Northern Natal coast causing damage. The question that arises out of this case is 
whether the owner of the "KATINA P" can be held strictly-liable in terms of South 
African law for the damage caused by the oil. It is submitted that as the oil was 
discharged outside the prohibited area of the Republic it is not a discharge as 
contemplated by Pacoposoa and thus the damage, although it occurred within the 
territory as defined by _Pacoposoa, will not be recoverable in terms of the provisions 
of the Act. 
The most important enquiry ~s what constitutes loss or damage in terms of Pacoposoa. 
There are many different forms of loss or damage that may result as a result of a 
discharge of oil. For example there may be actual _pJ!xsical damage to fishing nets or 
to fishing boats. There can be a loss of a non-physical nature such as a fisherman's 
loss of income resulting from the discharge of oil into his fishing grounds, or the 
coastal hotelier who loses trade as a result of the pollution damage. There can be loss 
resulting from the measures taken to avoid the discharge of oil, or the costs of 
cleaning u2_the oil spill. I shall look at each of these heads of damage separately. 
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1. ' Physical Loss or Damage 
The words "loss or damage" must be interpreted in their ordinary meaning106 and thus 
as South African law allows actual physical loss or damage to be recovered at 
common law107 there will be no bar on a claimant claiming for the actual physical loss 
or damage he suffered as a result of pollution damage. 
11. Non-Physical Loss or Damage 
The question that needs to be addressed here is whether the words "loss or damage" 
cover the instance where loss or damage has occurred without there being any actual 
physical loss or damage to corporeal property belonging to the claimant. 108 This is the 
so called pure economic loss or mere pecuniary loss situation. 
South African courts have accepted that the mere fact that the claim is for non-
_p_hysical damage is no bar to liability. 109 However the problem with allowing a claim 
for pure economic loss is that there may be a multitude of claims arising out of a 
single incident for which the ship-owner would be held strictly liable .. Thus the 
a IP.roach of the South African Courts has been to allow claims for pure economic .. ,. 
loss, but to limit the 'liability of the defendant within reasonable grounds. The manner 
in which the Courts have sought to limit the application of claims for pure economic 
loss is on the basis of _policy considerations. These policy considerations are based 
- upon the duty of care which the defendant owes to the plaintiff110 and, to determine 
whether the breach of this duty is wrongful, the Courts have adopted the following 
guidelines:cr lo(o"c1.,0I' \f\ll....(.u.~ al 1~-\-
(1) "a defendant's conduct, including an omission, is regarded as 
unlawful (wrongful) when the circumstances of the case are of 
such a nature that it not only incites the moral indignation, but 
also that t~e legal convictions of the community demand that it 
ought to be regarded asJ1nlawful and that the damage suffered by 
"~·-.. " 
the plaintiff ought to be made good by the defendant. "111 
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(2) "In coming to its conclusion the court should, inter alia, have 
regard to the probable extent of the foreseeable loss; the degree 
of risk that the loss would be suffered as a result of the conduct 
complained of; the value to the defendant and/or society of the 
object which the defendant was seeking to achieve; whether there 
were reasonably practicable measures available to the defendant 
to avert the loss. "112 
(3) Allowing the claim "might give rise to a multiplicity of actions 
and the situation might be fraught with an overwhelming potential 
liability" .113 
Thus in each case where there has been pure economic loss resulting from a discharge 
of oil, the circumstances of each case will have to be investigated to determine 
whether the Court, based on policy considerations, will allow the claim. Although the 
guidelines above are not exhaustive, it is submitted that, based upon those guidelines, 
a Court faced with the question of allowing a claim for p~re economic loss would. 
have little hesitation in granting the claim. This submission is based on the following: 
1. Due to the ship:owner being entitled to limit his liability in terms of Section 
9(5) of Pacoposoa, there is only a specified limited amount from which to 
satisfy claims resulting from the discharge of oil that results in oil pollution 
damage. There is no distinction in the section between physical and non-
physical damage and thus the limitation fund established by the owner is to 
satisfy all claims resulting from the incident. Further in terms of Section 10(1) 
of the Act the ship-owner shall not be liable otherwise than in terms of the Act. 
Thus if the extent of the losses exceeds the amount to which the ship-owner is 
entitled to limit his liability, then the claimant cannot proceed against the owner 
at common law. The net result of this is that by allowing a claim for pure 7 
economic loss the Court is not subjecting the owner to a multiQlicitY, of claims ) 
with an overwhelming_P.otential liability as, as indicated, the~nv.nerJs only 
Jiable tp_~-fillysifie_d_maximum. _ 
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2. If, on the other hand, the owner losses his right to limit his liability in terms 
of Pacoposoa as the damage resulted from his actual fault or privity114 then in 
this instance, it is submitted the owner would fall foul of the first guideline 
enunciated above. The owner of a ship carrying oil, if the discharge was as a 
result of his own misconduct, should make good the damage caused to a 
claimant, based on policy considerations. 
3. In addition to the above, it is submitted that, should a South African Court be 
faced with the question of allowing a claim for pure economic loss arising 
from pollution damage, it would allow the claim on the second guideline above. 
Although the ship-owner is held strictly liable for the tlamage in terms of 
Section 13 of Pacoposoa, the owner of a tanker carrying more than 2 000 tons 
of oil must have insurance cover for oil pollution damage. The ship-owner 
would thus, whilst not avoiding liability, be indemnified against this form of 
damage. Further the Court should take into account that the owner of a ship 
should foresee that should his ship discharge oil, due to the nature of oil 
pollution damage, there are likely to be extensive claims based upon pure. 
economic loss. Further as the majority of the oil passing our shores is not\ 
destined· for South Africa, there is no reason based upon policy considerations 
not to allow the- claim. There is no real benefit to society by allowi~g~il to_ 
pass around our coastline. On the contrary there is a great risk to society and 
the Courts should as a matter of policy adopt the principle that the polluter is 
liable for all losses, including pure economic loss, that his pollution causes. 
111. Costs of Preventive Measures and Clean-up Costs 
The ship-owner is held strictly liable for the costs of any measu:es taken by the 
Minister (here the Minister refers to the Minister of Transport115) after an incident has 
occurred for the purpose of reducing the loss or damage resulting from a discharge 
of oil as defined in the Act. 116 In this instance any measures taken by the Minister to 
P.revent or minimise the extent of pollution damage taken after a discharge of oil are 
recoverable from the owner. 
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The limitation on this liability is that the measures must be taken by the Minister. 
Thus if an individual takes any measures to prevent his property being damaged by 
oil resulting from a discharge then the costs of these measures are not recoverable 
from the ship-owner. Thus although the owner is strictly lia~e f~r any measures taken \ 
by the Minister he is not liable for any measures ~ak~n by an individual. 
Although the Minister is responsible for combating_ pollution damage for th_e -~e.p_ubli~ 
itself, an individual should also be covered for the £QSts._of hl~pJeventive measures, 
as in terms of South African law on damages, the claimant must act reasonablr to 
mitigate his loss. 117 If the individual did not take reasonable measures to mitigate his 
loss, then although the ship-owner is strictly liable for the loss, the damages to which 
the claimant is entitled will be affected. 
A further question that needs to be looked at is whetheI_Qie ship_-owner i~ strktly_ 
liable in terms of Section 9(l)(b) for the costs t~en before the discharg~_of._oil to 
prevent the discharge, ie the so-calledGm~eat c~or example if there is a 
tanker that has indicated that she has suffered damage and is likely to discharge oil and 
the Minister instructs that her cargo be trans-shipped to prevent discharge of oil. If 
this is completed successfully and no oil is discharged, is the owner strictly liable for --
these costs? It is submitted that on the wording of Section 9(1)~) the owner will be 
held strictly liable for these costs. The words "or for the purposes of preventing such _,,, 
loss or damage being caused, whether or n2t ~- d_i~charge as .~ont~I1Jp_la!~~-i_!!._p_aragraph 
(a) h_~s occurred and whether or not such a disc~~ge ~Jl fact subsequently occurs"•118 , 
on their ordinary meaning, are sufficiently clear to indicate that the legislature \ ----
intended that this_situation be covered. Further in terms of Section 9(2)(a) of the Act 
"any measures taken by the Minister to prevent pollution of the sea by oil discharged 
or likely to be discharged from any ship, tanker ... shall be deemed to be measures 
0 
taken by the Minister for the purposes of Section 9(l)(b)." Thus this section 
expressly provides that any measures taken to prevent a likely discharge of oil are 
measures taken in terms of Section 9(1)(b). r 
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This submission is further supported b~~~ which states that the owner will 
not be held strictly liable for the costs and damage from an anticipated discharge if he · 
falls within the requirements of that section. Thus the intention of the legislature is 
clear on this issue and the ship-owner will be held liable for the costs incurred to 
avoid oil pollution damage. 
The ship-owner is also held strictly liable for the costs of removing any pollution of --
the sea by oil. 119 
The costs of cleaning the sea shores following the discharge of oil are also recoverable 
from the owner as the definition of the sea includes the land between the high water 
mark and the low water mark. 120 
The ship-owner is also strictly liable for any loss or damage in the area of the 
Republic taken by the Minister after the discharge of oil. 121 Thus should the Minister 
take measures to prevent the extent of the damages as a result of a discharge and these 
measures cause further damage then the owner is liable for these further damages. 
\{: Is the ship-owner strictly liable for damage to the environment? 
e The question here is whether the phrase II any loss or damage II allows an action to 
r_e$tore the environment following the discharge of oil. Pacoposoa makes specifi 
provision that the ship-owner shall be held strictly liable for an amount to be 
determined by the Director-General of the Department of Transport to compensate the 
South African National Foundation for the Conservation of Coastal Birds for expenses 
incurred in rescuing, cleaning and feeding coastal birds as a result of the discharge of 
oil. 122 On the question of other environmental damage, it is submitted that the 
wording of the Act is broad enough to encompass this head of damage but the question 
is who may institute a claim for this form of damage. 
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To institute an action for damages, the plaintiff must have the requisite locus standi 
or capacity to sue. 123 Part of the requisite capacity to sue is that the party has a legal 
interest in the property over which he is instituting action. In the case of the 
environment it is important to determine who has the requisite locus standi to institute 
an action for damage to the environment. The State President is the owner of the sea 
and the sea-shore in the Republic124 and is not entitled to alienate any part of the sea 
or sea-shore. 125 The sea and sea-shore are defined as the waters and the bed of the 
sea under the water and the land between the high water and low water mark. 126 
Thus in South African law the State is the owner of the sea and sea-shore and it is the 
State that should have the locus standi to bring an action for the restoration of the 
environment. However it has been argued127 correctly, it is submitted, that it is 
unlikely that the Courts would allow the State to bring about such a claim on the basis 
that the State is not under a statutory duty to maintain the environment. 
. What is the position of a.nrivate individual wishing to bring a daim for damage to the 
environment? It has long been accepted in South African law that there is no broad 
action in the public interest. 128 Thus where an individual does not have locus standi 
to institute an action for an infringement of a right, he cannot bring an action on the 
basis that it is in the public interest that his action be allowed. Flowing from the 
above, it is to be concluded that in terms of South African law, there is no strict 
lil!_bility on the ship-owner for environmental damage caused by his vessel. 
Having considered in what circumstances the ship-owner will be held to be strictly 
\ 
liable, I now turn to the circumstances in which the ship-owner will not be held liable 
for pollution damage resulting from the discharge of oil from his vessel. 
The most important provision relating to the non-liability of the vessel-owner is 
contained in Section 10(1) of Pacoposoa. This section provides that "the owner of a 
ship, tanker or offshore installation shall not be liable otherwise than under the 
provisions of the Act for . . " 
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This section is of great importance as it denies a claimant who has a claim in terms 
of Pacoposoa, from proceeding against the owner at common law. Thus if the owner 
is entitled to avoid liability in terms of the Act then he avoids liability altogether. It 
is thus of cardinal importance to know in what circumstances he will be able to avoid 
liability in terms of the Act. 
{«,\ In the first instance the ship-owner will not be liable for any loss, damage or costs 
enumerated under Section 9(1) if he can prove that the loss resulted from: 
"an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or an exceptional, 
inevitable and irresistible natural phenomenon". 129 
This is the same provision as that contained in the "CLC" and is based upon the same 
reasoning as that in the "CLC", namely that these are the types of occurrences which 
are difficult to insure against. It is of importance to note firstly, that the onus of proof 
is on the ship-owner and, secondly that the notion of "an exceptional, inevitable and 
irresistible natural phenomenon" is stricter that the Act of God notion. 
(,~ The second instance in which the ship-owner will avoid liability is where the damage 
resulted wholly from the act or omission of a person with tµe intent to do damage, but 
excludes the owner himself or any of his servants or agents. 130 In this case the owner 
has to prove that the damage resulted wholly from the act committed with the intent 
to caus·e damage, in order for him to avoid his liability. 
~\ The third circumstance in which the owner can avoid any liability in terms of the Act, 
is if the discharge results wholly from the negligence or other wrongful act of any 
government responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids. 131 
Here again the onus is upon the owner to show that the discharge resulted solely from 
the negligence of the government to maintain the lights or other navigational aids. 
Page 43 
l'u\ A further limitation on the appli~ation of Pacoposoa is contained in Section .11. In 
terms of this section a warship or a tanker at the time used exclusively by a state for 
non-commercial purposes shall not be subject to the provisions of Section 9 of 
Pacoposoa. 
Liability under Pacoposoa is only legally enforceable if proceedings are instituted 
within three years from the date on which the claim arose. 132 If there i~ a series of 
incidents giving rise to damage then the claim must be instituted within six years of 
the first of the occurrences giving rise to the damage. 133• This is of importance as, 
should a ship that has already discharged oil sink with some oil in her tanks, it may 
take a long time before th~'··tanks rust and release the oil. In this instance the first 
discharge would have occurred at the time of the sinking of the ship and the 
subsequent discharge could be years later. If the claimant suffers damage as a result 
of the subsequent discharge, he must bring proceedings within six years of the first 
occurrence. There is an anomaly in this regard in the Act as in terms of Section 1(2) 
where more than one discharge . of oil results from the same occurrence or from a :. . 
series of occurrences then they are, in terms of this section, regarded as one discharge 
for the purposes of the Act. Thus according to this section the claim for subsequent 
damage must be brought within three years of the first occurrence. 
As the Act is ambiguous on this point, the better approach, it is submitted, is to allow 
the claimant six years from the date of the first discharge in which to submit his 
claim. 
b. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
Pacoposoa has followed the II CLC II by entitling the owner to limit his liability-f-er-aey 




"if the owner of any ship, tanker or offshore installation incurs a liability 
in terms of the provisions of sub-section (1), for any loss or damage 
suffered or costs incurred as a result of an incident which has occurred 
without such owner's fault or privity 
(a) the provisions of Section 261 of the Merchant Shipping Act(Act 
No 57 of 1951), shall not apply in respect of such liability; 
(b) the aggregate of all amounts payable by such owner in respect of 
such liability, in so far as it relates to a particular incident, shall 
not exceed -
(i) in the case of a ship or a tanker, one hundred and 
thirty-three units of account for each ton of the 
ship's or tanker's tonnage, or fourteen million units 
of account, whichever is the lesser; 
(ii) in the case of an offshore installation, a sum to be 
determined by the Minister, but not exceeding 
fourteen million units of account." 
The first requirement to enable the owner of the vessel to limit his liability is that a 
liability in terms of Section 9(1) must have been incurred. Thus the owner, in order 
to limit his liability, will have to prove that the damage resulted from a discharge as 
contemplated in the section. In the case of the damage caused by oil droplets 
illustrated above, where the owner will not be entitled to limit his liability if a claim 
is instituted against him on the basis that he has not incurred a liability in terms of 
Section 9(1). 
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(11> The second requirement for limitation of liability is that only the owner of the ship, 
tanker or offshore installation is entitled to limit his liability. This restriction on the 
right to limit liability flows from the channelling of liability introduced by the Act. In 
terms of Section 10(2) no servant or agent of the owner of a ship, tanker or offshore 
installation shall be liable to any person for any loss, damage or costs. Further, any 
salvor performing salvage services with
1 
the consent of either the owner or the Master 
will be regarded as an agent of the owner and thus will not be liable in his personal 
capacity for any damage or losses resulting from a discharge of oil. 134 The Act also 
protects the servants of the state when engaged in taking measures to prevent or 
remove oil pollution, from being liable for any further damage. 135 Thus the Act 
attempts to limit the claims against anyone other than the owner of the vessel. The 
reason behind this is that the owner has the insurance against pollution damage. By 
making the owner liable for all damages resulting from the discharge of oil, the Act 
makes the position of the claimant easier as he is not required t~/ault on the part of 
the owner, as he is held strictly liable. If the claimant were to claim against anyone 
else he would have to prove the necessary fault requirement. 
Who is the owner? 
This is of importance for firstly, it is only the owner who is entitled to limit his 
liability and secondly, and more importantly, the right to limit is lost if the incident 
results from the fault or privity of the owner. 
The owner of a ship or tanker is the person or persons registered as the owner of such 
ship or tanker or, in the absence of registration, the person or persons to whom the 
ship or tanker belongs. 136 
When does the owner lose his right to limit? 
In terms of Section 9(5) the owner loses his right to limit his liability if the jn_~t 
resulted from his fault or privity. These words are the same as those used in Section 
261 of the Merchant Shipping Act137(MSA) and will be interpreted as they have been 
in terms of that Act. The words fault and privity have been given the following 
meaning: 
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"Fault translates easily enough into negligence or culpa on the part of 
the ship-owner, whilst privity, as in the doctrine of privity of contract, 
suggests the ship-owner being party or privy to what occurred". 138 . 
Although it is clear that it must be the fault or privity of the owner at the time of the 
incident that resulted in the discharge of oil, how does one determine whether there 
was fault or privity on the part of the owner? In terms of the definition of an owner 
quoted above, the owner is that person. or persons registered as the owner of the ship 
or tanker. What is the position if the ship is not owned by a person or persons but by 
a company? Is the company entitled to limit its liability and if so, can there be fault 
or privity on the part of the company? In this instance the Court seized with the 
matter will have little difficulty in holding that the words "person or persons" is broad 
enough to incorporate a juristic person such as a company. If the Court does not adopt 
this approach, the whole purpose of the Act will be frustrated, as then any company 
owning a vessel would escape liability on the basis that it is a juristic person and not 
a natural person. 
0he next enquiry is when does a company being a ship-owner lose its right to limit 
(\~ts liability? In this instance one has to look firstly, at what constitutes fault or privity 
· on the part of the company and secondly, what degree of fault or privity is required 
- for the company to lose its right to limit. 
· The first enquiry has only been judicial!)' considered once in South Africa. 139 This 
case dealt with the interpretation of the words "without the actual fault or privity" in 
terms of the MSA. ~ The Court held that the meaning to be given to these words was 
the same as that given to the same words in English law. 140 i.e. that the words actual 
. fault or privity inean there must be something blameworthy in the conduct of the 
owner. The Court then went on to hold that when determining the actual fault or 
privity of the company one must seek the directing mind and willtthe company and 
that the fault or privity must occur at this level of the company 141 1 
I 
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The second enquiry is what degree of fault or privity is required on the part of the 
company. The Court in the St Pardan case looked at the fact: of the case to determine 
whether there was actual fault or privity on the part of the owners of the ship. In this 
case the Court held that the owners were at fault as they had knowledge of the 
circumstances that gave rise to the casualty. !;_2 The approach of the Court in the St 
Pardan case mirrors the approach in English law that the owner of ship must exercise 
the same degree of effective management, being supervision and control, of his ship's 
day to day activities. 143 Thus it is submitted that a Court faced with the interpretation 
of Section 9(5) of Pacoposoa will interpret the requirements of "fault and privity" in 
the same light as the requirements of Section 261 of MSA. This will be of great 
importance as the onus of proof rests with the ship-owner to prove that there was no 
fault or privity on the part of the owner. 144 This could lead to the owner of the vessel 
losing his right to limit his liability if he cannot show that the incident resulted 
. notwithstanding the effective management of the vesselJ Thus if the incident results 
from factors which the effective management were aware of, or ought to have been 
aware of, then the owner will not be entitled to limit his liability and the claimant will 
be entitled to recover the full extent of his losses or damage. 
In terms of Section 9(5)(a) the provisions of Section 261 of the MSA do not apply to 
a liability incurred in Section 9(1). Thus if the owner loses his right to limit liability 
in terms of Section 9(5) then he is not entitled to limit his liability in terms of the 
MSA. 
The amount to which a ship-owner is entitled to limit his liability is determined 
according to the tonnage of the vessel. The owner is entitled to limit his liability to 
one hundred and thirty-three units of account per ton or fourteen million units of 
account, whichever is the lesser. A unit of account is defined as "a Special Drawing I Right(SDR) as defined by the International Monetary Fund.and the value of the SOR 
1 in South African currency shall be calculated ... at the time payment is made" .145 The 
lvalue of a SDR at present is R3.948. 146 . 
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The method of determining the tonnage of the vessel is also defined in the Act. The 
tonnage to be used in the calculation of the limitation of a ship is the ~ tonnage plus 
any engine room space deducted to obtain the net tonnage. 147 The net tonnage of a 
vessel is only that part of the ship which is revenue earning and thus excludes the 
crew accommodation. 148 To determine the net tonnage one deducts the non-revenue 
earning spaces from the gross tonnage. Thus when determining the ship's tonnage one 
must include the engine room space and multiply each ton by the value of a SOR to 
calculate the amount to which the ship is entitled to limit its liability. For example if 
there is a ship of 5 000 tons that has discharged oil that has resulted in oil pollution 
damage, the maximum liability of the ship-owner will be 5 000 x 133 units of account 
per ton. This amount to 5 000 x R525.08 = R2 625 409.00. However before 
accepting this as the limitation, one has to determine whether this amount is the lesser 
of the two permitted in terms of the Act. The maximum amount for which the ship-
. owner is liable in terms of Pacoposoa is 14 million units of account. This amounts to 
14 million x R3,948 = R55 272 000,00. Thus in this example the owner of a 5 000 
ton ship will be entitled to limit his liability to a maximum amount of R2 625 400,00. 
\ This amount is the total amount available to cover the costs of any damage, preventive 
rieasures and clean-up costs. 
The maximum amount that the ship-owner may be liable for may seem sufficient to 
cover claims resulting from a discharge of oil, until one considers that the claims 
following the stranding of the "AMOCO CADIZ" amounted to US$ 2 billion. 149 As 
there are many tankers of the same or similar size to the "AMOCO CADIZ" rounding 
the Cape, the threat is that, if there is an incident off the South African Coast, the 
amount of damages and losses resulting from the incident will be of a similar amount. 
flf there is an incident, the amount to which the owner is entitled to limit his liability 
will mean that there will be many claimants who will not be able to recover the full 
extent of the damages suffered as a result of the discharge. This in effect will defeat 
the object of the Act which is to provide an individual who has suffered loss as the 
result of the discharge of oil with an effective remedy to recover his loss. 
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An owner whose ship has caused pollution damage resulting from a discharge of oil 
may apply to the Supreme Court150 for an order determining the extent of his 
aggregate liability for which he will be liable in terms of Section 9(5). 151 The benefit 
to the owner of bringing this application is that a fund is created which stipulates the 
maximum for which he will be liable in terms of the Act. Once the fund is constituted 
the ship-owner shall nominate a person to act as a trustee of the fund who must be 
appointed by the Master of the Supreme Court. 152 The trustee will then distribute the 
fund amongst the claimants. There is no provision in the Act that the claimants receive 
a pro rata portion of their claim if there are insufficient funds available to meet all the 
claims nor is there any provision that the fund must retain some funds to meet any 
claims arising from a series of discharges. This is a serious 13:cuna in the Act for, as 
we have discussed above, there may be claims resulting from a subsequent discharge 
that may be brought against the ship-owner up to six years after the first discharge . 
. If the trustees distribute the fund prior to this six year period having elapsed, a 
claimant having suffered damage from a subsequent discharge having the same origin 
as the first discharge that caused the damage, whilst having a claim in law, would not 
be in a position to enforce his claim as the owner's liability is restricted to his limited 
amount and the claimant cannot proceed in terms of the common law. 
'j The ship-owner, if he has paid any amount to any person who has suffered damage 
'·; 
1 
prior to the establishment of the fund, can claim that amount from the fund once 1t has 
i been established. 153 The owner has the right to, if he can establish that he may be 
compelled to pay a claimant subsequent to the distribution of the fund, request that the 
trustees retain an amount out of the fund from which the owner may be compensated 
for this payment. 154 
This provision tries to fill the lacuna discussed above but does not, it is submitted, 
achieve its aim. The reason for this submission is as follows. If the ship-owner 
approaches the Court to determine his maximum liability and he then constitutes a 
fund, this is the maximum for which he would be liable for all claimants. 
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If there is a subsequent claim as envisaged in Section 12(7), the owner would only be 
liable if the claims do not exceed the amount in the fund. In this instance he would be 
entitled to request that the trustees retain a portion of the fund to cover these claims. 
However in practice, due to the magnitude of the owner's potential liability resulting 
from the discharge of oil and the small amount to which he is entitled to limit his 
liability in terms of Pacoposoa, it is unlikely that the claims will be less than the 
amount to which he has limited his liability and, should he be faced with a further 
claim, he can plead that he has already limited his liability and that the. claimant must 
proceed against the proceeds of this limitation. 
c.COMPULSORYINSURANCE 
n terms of Pacoposoa no tanker carrying more than 2 000 long tons of oil in bulk as 
cargo shall be allowed to enter or leave a port in the Republic unless it has on board 
a certificate stating that the tanker has insurance or security for an amount to which 
the owner will be entitled to limit his liability for damages arising as a result of the 
discharge of oil-155 This provision is the same as that contained in the II CLC II and the 
'comments made earlier on this provision also apply here. A part of the requirement 
that does warrant some comment is the prohibition of a ship entering or leaving a port 
in the Republic without a valid certificate. A certificate is a valid certificate if it is 
issued by the Government of a contracting state. 156 This requirement further illustrates 
the major drawback of Pacoposoa. 
The definition of a tanker only includes tankers that are subject to the provisions of 
the 11 CLC 11 • However in terms of Section 13(8) a tanker from a non-contracting state 
will not be allowed to enter or leave a port in the Republic unless it has on board a 
certificate issued by a contracting state. 
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The question that is raised by this requirement is why does a non-contracting tanker 
require a certificate if the provisions of Pacoposoa do not apply to it? 
If the legislature requires that the tanker has a certificate before it is allowed to enter 
into a South African port, why do the provisions of Pacoposoa not apply to the tanker? 
Where the tanker does not have a valid certificate. the tanker can be detained until a 
valid certificate is produced and if the tanker attempts to leave the master and the 
owner shall be guilty of an offence. 157 
A certificate will not be recognised as valid if the insurance can be cancelled for any 
reason except if the insurance or security is going to expire within three months, nor 
will it be valid if it is going to expire whilst the tanker will be travelling through 
South African waters. 158 
The provisions of this section also apply to ships. 158a 
It is obvious from the above that the question of insurance is taken in a very serious 
light in Pacoposoa. This results from the strict liability placed upon the owner and the 
attempt to avoid the problems of the one-ship company that has no assets against 
which to proceed. The strict requirement of a ship or tanker having insurance is also 
of importance, as, in terms of Section 15(1), a person having a claim against the 
owner of a tanker resulting from the discharge of oil can proceed directly against the 
insurer who issued the certificate. If the claim is brought against the insurer, he is 
entitled to raise the same defence to the claim as the owner and has an additional 
defence that the incident resulted from the wilful conduct of the owner himself. 159 In 
this instance the insurer will not be liable and the claimant will have to proceed against 
the ship-owner himself, although as has been discussed, the owner will not be entitled 
to limit his liability. 
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'The claimant proceeding against the insurer must make sure that the incident did not 
result from the fault or privity of the owner of the tanker, as, if he institutes action 
against the insurer, the insurer is entitled to limit his liability in terms of Section _ 
9(5)(b), whether or not the owner of the tanker was at fault or was privy to the 
incident. tro In this instance the claimant would do better to proceed against the owner 
who would not be entitled to limit his liability. 
Although the Act provides for the compulsory carrying of a certificate of insurance 
and entitles the claimant to proceed directly_!gainst the insurer, the Act makes no 
provision for the instance where the insurer is not within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Thus it may result that the claimant has a claim, but, due to the ship sinking and the 
owner being outside the jurisdiction of the Court, the claimant has to proceed against 
the insurer. As discussed above, the purpose of the certificate is to ensure that a 
claimant will be able to recover his losses resulting from pollution damage. If there 
is no way in which the claimant can bring the insurer before a South African Court, 
then the purpose ul having a certificate of insurance will be frustrated. It is submitted 
that the way in which to rectify this defect is to amend the Act to require that the 
insurer must have an agent in South Africa against whom the claimant can proceed. 
It is of interest to note that the provisions relating to proceedings against the insurer 
only apply to tankers. Thus although a ship is required to have a valid certificate of 
insurance, a claimant claiming for pollution damage caused by the shiQ is not ~ntitle~d 
to proceed directly against the insurer. This is a strange limitation on the claimant, for 
there is no sound reason why the claimant cannot proceed against the insurer. The 
whole purpose of requiring a certificate of insurance is to ensure that the owner will 
have funds for the claimant to proceed against and there is no difference, from an 
insurers point of view, between a claim for damage caused by a tanker or a ship 
except the quantum _involved. 
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d. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Pacoposoa makes provision that the Supreme Court of South Africa and, within their 
jurisdictional limits, the Magistrates' Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of all 
causes of action arising out of the provisions of the Act. 161 However as indicated 
above, the claimant may not be in a position to enforce the judgement given by the 
Supreme Court, due to the fact that the ship-owner is not before the Court or that he 
has no assets in South Africa161a • There is a way in which the claimant can enforce 
· his claim against the ship-owner if the owner is not before the Court or if he has no 
property within the area of the Court for the claimant to execute against. This way 
is to proceed in terms of the Supreme Court sitting as a Court of Admiralty as defined 
in the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act162 (AJRA). 
In terms of AJRA the Court sitting as a Court of Admiralty has the jurisdiction to hear 
and determine any maritime claim, irrespective of where the claim arose. 163 Section 
1 defines a maritime claim and, in terms of Section l(z), pollution of the sea or the 
seashore by oil or by any other substance shall be a maritime claim. Thus the 
Admiralty Court would have jurisdiction to hear a claim resulting from the discharge 
of oil that resulted in damage. However it must be stressed that the Court, whilst 
having jurisdiction to entertain the claim, can only apply the provisions of Pacoposoa 
if the damage falls within the ambit of the Act. The great advantage of proceeding in 
Admiralty is that the claimant is able to proceed against any associated ship of the ship 
that caused the damage. 164 
This entitles the claimant who has suffered pollution damage from a vessel that has 
sunk or been destroyed, to proceed against an associated ship owned by the same 
owner. For the purposes of AJRA an associated ship is a ship owned by the same 
person who was the owner of the ship concerned at the time the maritime claim 
arose, or owned, at the time when the action commenced, by a person who controlled 
the company which owned the ship concerned when the maritime claim arose. 165 
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The provisions of the associated ship clause are very broad, for the claimant only has 
to show that the associated ship is owned by a person who had control over the 
company which owned the ship that caused the damage. Thus if the ship-owner owns 
any other ships that come within the jurisdiction of the Court, the claimant can 
institute his claim against one of these ships. 
A further useful provision for the claimant is contained in AJRA. This is the action 
in rem procedure which allows the claimant to proceed against the ship itself. To 
institute an action in rem, the claimant must first arrest the vessel. 166 By arresting the 
vessel, the claimant is ensured of having an asset of the ship-owner against which to 
/ 
execute for his claim, as the ship will only be released fr~m arrest if the owner 
establishes security for the claim. 167 
SUMMARY 
Thus the claimant will, by proceeding by way of Admiralty, be certain that the Court 
will be able to entertain his claim and more importantly, he will be able to enforce any 
order that the Court makes. 
From the above discussion of the provisions of Pacoposoa it is evident that there will 
be instances where a claimant will suffer pollution damage. resulting from the 
discharge of oil that does not fall within the erovisions of the Act. Examples of 
instances in which the claimant will not be able to institute action in terms of 
Pacoposoa are the following: 
1. where the damage did not result from a discharge as defined in 
the Act in that the discharge occurred outside the area of the 
Republic or that the damage was caused by oil droplets being 
absorbed into the clouds and subsequently raining on the land; 
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@ where the discharge resulted from a tanker not carrying oil in bulk as 
cargo; 
111. where the discharge resulted from a tanker not subject to the 
provisions of the Act, ie the tanker does not comply with the 
definition of a tanker contained in the Act. 
Further the claimant may wish to institute action against the person who directly 
caused his damage. As we have seen, the agents and servants of the owner of the 
vessel cannot be held liable for any loss or damage resulting from the discharge of 
oil. 168 The question that arises is what is the position of a ch~erer of the vessel? Will 
he be regarded as an agent or servant of the owner? It is submitted that the demise 
charterer (a charterer who hires the whole vessel from the owner for hire and the 
. possession and control of the vessel passes to the charterer instead of the owner169) 
will not be regarded as a servant or agent of the owner as the J)Ossession and control 
of the ship passes to the charterer. Thus if the vessel is on demise charter the charterer 
is not protected against liability for oil pollution damage. 
The problem with proceeding against the charterer is that there is no strict liability 
imposed upon him in terms of Paco2osoa and thus the claimant will have to proceed 
against the charterer at common law. This does not prevent the claimant from 
proceeding against the owner of the ship in addition to instituting action against the 
charterer. 
The question is how does the claimant institute an action to recover the damages he 
has suffered in these instances? To determine this one has to consider position of the 
claimant at South African common law to determine whether he has an action and, if 
so, whether it is likely to be successful. 
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B. CIVIL LIABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN COMMON LAW FOR 
POLLUTION DAMAGE 
Asr indicated above, there will be instances where a claimant has suffered damage as 
a result of the discharge of oil that does {ot fall within damage as defined in section 
= 
9 (1) (a), (b) or (c) of Pacoposoa. In these instances the claimant will not be able to 
rely upon the provisions of the Act and thus will have to look at South African civil 
law to determine whether he is able to recover the damages he has suffered as a result 
of the discharge of oil. _ 
The position of civil liability in South African law for damage resulting from oil 
pollution from a ship will be looked at under the following headings: 
1. The jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a claim for pollution damage from a 
ship 
11. The law to be applied 
111. An examination of the law to be applied with a specific emphasis on the 
requirements for Aquilian liability ie. Roman-Dutch Law. 
1v. The owner's right to limit his liability. 
1. The Jurisdiction of the Court to Entertain a Claim for Pollution Damage from 
a Ship: 
The starting point in determining whether the claimant will be able to bring a 
claim for.damage that he has suffered as a result of oil pollution damage is to 
determine whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. There will 
be no difficulty in the Court having jurisdiction to hear the matter if the actiop. 
giving rise to the damage occurred within the territorial waters of the Republic, 
as it has been held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extends to the 
extent of the territorial waters as defined in Section 2 of the Territorial Waters 




What is the position if the action causing the damage occurred outside the 
territorial waters? It is submitted that in this instance the Supreme Court, 
sitting as a Court of Admiralty, would have jurisdiction to hear the matter for 
the following reasons: 
1. In terms of Section 1 (z) of AJRA, any claim relating to pollution of the 
sea or the seashore is a maritime claim. 
For the claimant to show that his claim is a maritime claim, he will have to 
show that his claim relates to pollution of the sea or the seashore. 
11. If the claimant is not in a position to show that his damage resulted from 
pollution of the sea or seashore as defined in the Sea-Shore Act, 171 he 
still has a maritime claim, as he can argue that in terms of Section 1 
(ee), his claim by its nature or subject matter is a marine or a maritime 
matter and should be regarded as a maritime claim. 
Thus the Supreme Court, sitting as a Court of Admiralty, would have 
jurisdiction to hear a claim resulting from oil pollution damage as in terms of 
AJRA the Court can hear a maritime claim irrespective of where it arose. 
The Law to be Applied: 
The first inquiry is what law would be applied when claiming for pollution 
damage when proceeding in the Supreme Court exercising its Admiralty 
jurisdiction. Section 6(1) of AJRA provides as follows: 
"6(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the common la_w 
contained, a court in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction shall -
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(a) with regard to any matter in respect of which a court of admiralty 
of the Republic referred to in the Colonial Courts of Admiralty 
Act, 1890, of the United Kingdom, had jurisdiction immediately 
before the commencement of this Act, apply the law which the 
High Court of Justice of the United Kingdom in the exercise of 
its admiralty would have applied with regard to such a matter at 
such commencement, insofar as that law can be applied; 
(b) with regard to any other matter, apply the Roman-Dutch law 
applicable in the Republic." 
Thus if the Colonial Court of Admiralty at 1890 had jurisdiction to hear a claim 
relating to damage resulting from pollution, then the law to be applied would 
be English law at 1983. If the Colonial Court of Admiralty did not have 
jurisdiction, then Roman-Dutch law would apply. Did the Colonial Court of 
Admiralty have jurisdiction to hear a claim based on pollution damage? The 
jurisdiction of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act was partly based upon 
prior Admiralty statutes. 172 One of these statutes was the Admiralty Court Act 
1861. 173 In terms of this statute a Court of Admiralty had jurisdiction over any 
claim for damage by a ship. 174 Does pollution damage resulting from the 
spillage of oil constitute damage done by a ship? It is submitted that in this 
instance the damage will not be regarded as damage by the ship as the trend in 
English law has been to limit this claim to damage resulting from the ship 
itself175 and further, in the case of pollution damage, the cause of the loss is the 
oil and not the ship. It would be stretching the meaning of the words damage 
by a ship to the extreme to allow a claim for pollution damage to be classified 
as damage resulting from a ship. Thus a South African court when exercising 
its Admiralty jurisdiction would apply Roman-Dutch law as the law to be 
applied in terms of Section 6(1)(b). 
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If the damage occurred within twelve nautical miles from the coast and 
the claimant did not wish to proceed in the Admiralty Court, then there 
can be no doubt that any Court hearing the matter would apply South 
African common law, ie Roman-Dutch law. What is the position under 
Roman-Dutch law? 
111. An examination of the law to be applied with a specific emphasis on the 
requirements of Aquilian liability ie. Roman-Dutch Law: 
The position under South African Law of delict is that "all damage caused 
unjustifiably is actionable whether caused intentionally or by negligence" .176 
South African delictual law is based upon general principles of liability and all 
actions based upon delict fall within these general principles. There are two 
forms that the action can take. The first is based upon the Actio Injuriarum 
which allows the claimant to claim damages for wrongs to his personality which 
is clearly not applicable here. The second is the Aquilian action which allows 
the claimant to claim patrimonial damages. 177 
Where a claimant has suffered damage as a result of oil pollution damage and 
he wishes to institute action against the person causing the harm, he would have 
to proceed in terms of the Lex Aquilia as the damage that he has suffered is 
patrimonial damage. Patrimonial loss is pecuniary or financial loss. 178 
What are the essential requirements to institute an action based upon Aquilian 
liability? 
The four requirements for Aquilian liability that will be looked at are as 
follows: 
1. a wrongful act or omission 
11. fault, which is either intent or negligence 
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iii. causation 
1v. patrimonial loss 
1. Wrongful Act or Omission: 
Conduct is wr.ongful if it is in conflict with the legal convictions of the 
community. 179 The determination of wrongfulness is based upon· the 
following factors; 
(a) the nature of the defendant's conduct 
(b) the nature of the defendant's fault 
( c) the nature of the harm suffered 180 
The determination is based upon a value judgement of balancing interests 
to reflect society's prevailing ideas of what is reasonable and proper, 
what conduct should be condemned and what should not. 181 
Thus the claimant claiming for loss or damage resulting from oil 
pollution will have to prove that the loss or damage results from the 
wrongful act or omission of either the ship-owner, master or the 
charterer. To prove that the act or omission was wrongful, the claimant 
will have to show that the conduct giving rise to his claim is the form 
of conduct -that society would condemn as being against the legal 
convictions of the community. In South African law, it is submitted, a 
Court would have little hesitation in holding that damage resulting from 
the discharge of oil is wrongful per se. This submission is based upon 
the fact that the Court would seek to protect the right of a claimant who 
has suffered damage at the hands of a negligent or intentional act of the 
ship-owner or those in control of the vessel and that the Court would 
allow the claimant to seek compensation for the loss that he has 
suffered. Moreover it is accepted in South African law that a posi~ve act 
that causes injury to a person or to property is wrongful. 182 
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11. Fault: 
The second requirement for the claimant to succeed in bringing an action 
.under the Lex Aquilia is that the person who caused the harm was at 
fault. Fault constitutes either intent or negligence. It is submitted that 
when dealing with a claim resulting from oil pollution damage the 
claimant will seldom, if ever, be in the position to prove intent. Perhaps 
the only occasion that intent may play a role is where the ship washes 
her tanks and the master foresees the possibility of the oil causing 
damage but disregards that consequence (the dolus eventualis 
situation183). 
However, due to negligence being a ground on which to found the action 
there is no real need to try and prove intention which is a subjective 
state of mind and therefore more difficult to prove. 
The plaintiff, when seeking compensation for damage that results from 
oil pollution damage, needs to show that the person causing the harm 
acted negligently. The test for negligence is based upon what the 
reasonable man in the same circumstances would have done. 184 In 
applying this test the Court looks at whether or not the harm was 
reasonably foreseeable and if the person took reasonable steps to guard 
against the harm 'occurring. 185 In the case of damage resulting from oil 
pollution from a ship, the Court will take the reasonable man to be a 
reasonable master and thus the plaintiff would have to show that the 
master did not act as a reasonable ship's captain would have in the 
circumstances. In these circumstances the plaintiff will be in a 
· favourable position as it is difficult for a master (and his owner on the 
principle of vicarious liability) to show that his conduct that resulted in 
the pollution damage was not negligent as, in principle, the reasonable 
master will not allow his cargo to cause damage. 
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iii. Causation: 
The claimant will have to show that his loss resulted from the negligent 
conduct of those in charge of the ship. The law affords the ship some 
protection in these circumstances as the principle is that the defendant 
should not be held liable for all the consequences of his wrongful 
. conduct. 186 There must be a cut off point at which the defendant will not 
be held liable for any damages or loss. What determines the cut off point 
in South African law? The law on this point is not settled and there are 
two tests that the Courts have adopted in South Africa. 
The first of these is the direct consequence test which holds that the 
defendant is liable for the direct consequences· that flow from . his 
wrongful conduct unless some new act intervenes after his act or 
omission. 187 The second test is the foreseeability test in which the 
defendant is held liable for all consequences that were reasonably 
foreseeable at the time of his act. 188 It is submitted that whatever the 
test is that is applied when there has been damage resulting from oil 
pollution, the result will not differ in practice, as the determination of 
a new act is based upon an objective determination and it can thus be 
used to limit the ambit of liability, while the approach of the 
foreseeability test is that the defendant should have foreseen the 
consequences of his act. This can also limit the ambit of liability. In the 
case of pollution damage it is difficult to see a Court not allowing the 
claimant, who has suffered patrimonial loss to recover that loss on 
policy considerations. How the Court frames these policy considerations 
can be either in terms of foreseeability or that there was no new act that 
caused the harm. 
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1v. Patrimonial Loss: 
As we have discussed above the essential element that distinguishes the 
Aquilian action from other actions in delict is that there must be 
patrimonial loss on the part of the claimant. Patrimonial loss is a 
calculable pecuniary loss. 189 Thus as pure economic loss is a calculable 
pecuniary loss this form of damage is also claimable in terms of this 
action. What was said about pure economic loss claimable in terms of 
Pacoposoa is of equal force here. 
1v. The Owner's right to limit his Liability: 
Of considerable importance when discussing patrimonial loss is the 
quantum that the claimant is entitled to recover. 
As has been alluded to earlier the ship-owner is entitled to limit his 
liability for claims relating to damage of property in terms of Section 
261 ofMSA. However in terms of Section 261 he loses his right to limit 
his liability if the loss is caused with his fault or privity. 
As has been discussed, fault is interpreted to include negligence and thus 
if the claimant is able to frame his claim in terms of the requirements of 
the Aquilian action and he proceeds against the ship-owner or master (if 
his negligent act binds the owner vicariously) the claimant will be able 
to claim the full extent of his loss without the attendant worries of the 
ship-owner being able to limit his liability and there not being sufficient 
funds to meet his claim. As the MSA limits the right to limit liability to 
the ship-owner only, if the claimant proceeds against the charterer he 
will be able to recover the full extent of his loss. 
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Thus an individual who has suffered loss or damage resulting from oil 
pollution will be able to institute an action based upon Aquilian liability 
if he can prove the requisite elements required. His claim will be for the 
full extent of his loss but unlike the position under Pacoposoa he is not 
guaranteed that the ship-owner will have the funds to meet his claim. 
This coupled with the fact that the plaintiff will have to prove at least 
negligence on. the part of the person responsible for the damage are the 
major draw-backs of proceeding in terms of the common law. However 
if the damage does not result from an instance covered by Pacoposoa at 
least the plaintiff has an avenue available to him through which to seek 
compensation from the wrongdoer. 
This is the position with regard to civil liability for oil pollution damage 
in South African law. As is evident from the above discussion there are 
several major failings within the South African regime relating to civil 
liability for oil pollution damage. 
Before making recommendations as to changes that should be made to 
the law it would be valuable to look at the approach of the United States 
to civil liability for oil pollution damage to determine whether there are 
any measures that can be adopted successfully in South Africa. I have 
decided to look at the law of the United States firstly, as the United 
Kingdom law is virtually the same as International law190 and secondly 
as the United States has not adopted the "CLC" and has recently 
introduced the Federal Oil Pollution Act191 which has innovative features 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CML LIABILITY IN UNITED STATES LAW 
The United States, the major importer of oil, has not ratified either the "CLC" or the 
Fund convention. 192 The reason for the non-ratification of these conventions was that 
the limits of liability available to the ship-owner were too low. At the IMO conference 
that led to the introduction of the "CLC" and "Fund" Protocols the U.S. argued 
strenuously for the adoption of the higher limits of liability that were eventually 
adopted by the conference. As a result of these higher limits the U.S. was about to 
adopt the "CLC" and the "Fund Convention" and the two Protocols when the 
"EXXON VALDEZ" disaster occurred. 193 As a result of the "EXXON VALDEZ" 
disaster a strong environmental lobby argued for unlimited liability on the part of the 
owner who's ship caused pollution damage. Coupled with this lobby was the pressure 
from the individual states that felt that their rights to enact legislation to deal with 
pollution damage would be limited. 194 The result of this pressure was that the U.S. 
Congress did not adopt the international conventions but introduced the Federal Oil 
Pollution Act (POPA). 
FOP A introduces a variety of innovative approaches to civil liability for oil pollution 
damage. I will look at some of these innovations that may have some importance for 
South Africa. 
The starting point is to determine in what circumstances liability will attach where 
there has been the discharge of oil. FOP A enacts strict liability on the ~art of the 
"responsible party" for civil liability under various heads of dama&e. "Responsible 
party" ~~eludes the owner, the demise charterer and the operator/manager of a vessel 
or off-shore installation. 195 Thus the_net of liability is cast extremely widely to 
encompass a responsible party where there has been oil pollution damage. The new 
act applies to all vessels entering the United States waters. 
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A vessel is defined as "every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance 
used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water other than a 
public vessel" .196 It is not confined to tankers as is the "CLC". 
FOP A lists specific heads of damage for which the responsible party will be held 
strictly liable. These heads introduce a new and innovative concept of pollution 
damage. In contrast to the definition of pollution damage in the "CLC" the types of 
damage for which liability will attach are specifically enumerated and are all 
embracing. The main types of damage that the act covers are: 197 
e ~ (1) all forms of damage to the environment including the costs of restoring the 
environment 
(2) all forms of damage to private individuals including economic losses 
(3) any person who loses subsistence use of the natural resources 
( 4) any losses resulting from loss of profits from the use of natural resources 
;f (5) all clean-up costs 
The responsible party is strictly liable for th~ !1bove dama~~s unless.!le can prove that 
the damage resulted wholly from an act of God, or of war, or an act or omission of 
a third party. 198 
As is evident from the above, the circumstances in which the responsible party will 
be able to avoid strict liability will be...Ye);'. limited. FOPA follows a similar reasoning 
to "CLC" in that by imposing strict liability the Act allows the responsible party to 
limit his liability. The amount to which he is entitled Jo limit is dependant upon the 
type of vessel. If the vessel is a tanker greater than 3 000 tons the responsible party 
can limit his liability to U.S.$1 200 per ton subject to a minimum of U.S.$ 10 million. 
If the vessel is not a tanker then the amount to which he can limit his liability is 
U.S.$ 600 per ton subject to a minimum ofU.S.$500 000. Any amount above this are 
covered by the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund which is funded through a levy 
system. 199 
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The fund has a limit of U.S.-$ 1 billion per incident.200 It would seem at first glance 
that there is not much difference between this fund and the Fund Convention except 
the amount for which each is liable. 
However this is not the case in terms of the U.S. law, as there has been severe 
criticism of this new regime200<a> as the owner will in most cases be unable to limit his 
liability, for the act provides that the responsible party loses his right to limit his 
liability if the incident resulted from either gross negligence or wilful misconduct or 
by any violation of an applicable Federal safety construction or operating regulation. 201 
This means that if the responsible party infringed an operating or safety regulation 
e then he would lose his right to limit his liability. This has a further problem for the 
responsible party for, due to his potential liability if he is unable to limit his liability, 
he will find it extremely difficult to obtain insurance for his possible extended liability. 
Although FOP A has been criticised, as has been indicated above, it has introduced the 
concept of civil liability for oil pollution damage into the U.S. It has also introduced 
a new definition of oil pollution damage to the international community and has set 
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CHAYfER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS 
From the discussion above, it is evident that the International Law of the Sea regime 
relating to civil liability for oil pollution from vessels has developed to keep up with 
the increasing problems associated with the transportation of oil by sea. 
Each step in the development of International Law has followed from a highly visible 
incident involving a vessel transporting oil, from the "TORREY CANYON" (which 
led to the adoption of the "CLC") via the "AMOCO CADIZ" (illustrating the need for 
a higher limitation amount) to the "EXXON VALDEZ" (the result of this being the 
U.S. FOPA). 
As a result of these casualties it was accepted that there were severe short-comings in 
the International regime regulating the position of a claimant who had suffered damage 
as a result of the escape of oil from a vessel. As these short-comings were identified -
the International Community moved to amend the International regime to alleviate the 
problem. Examples of this, as we have discussed, are the following: 
1. The recognition of the increase in the extent of the damages caused by oil 
pollution damage and the subsequent increase in the amount to which the ship-_ 
owner is entitled to limit his liability; 
11. The recognition of the need to extend the scope of the International provisions 
relating to civil liability to other vessels, excluding tankers, which carried oil 
in bulk as cargo; 
@· The increasing awareness of the environment and the need to protect it from 
pollution damage; 




Unfortunately, as has been discussed, South African Law on civil liability for oil 
Y-ollution damage has not developed in pace with the International law. As we have 
seen, S<:,~th African statutory law on civil liability-for oil pollution damage is regulated 
by PacoQosoa and as is evident from the analysis of Pacoposoa there are many 
problems with the Act. The most important problems with the Act are the following: 
-..11. The amount to which the ship-owner is entitled to limit his liability is minimal 
compared to the costs of the damage that result from· an incident 
#~ The definition of what constitutes a discharge limits the applicability of the Act 
Jiii. The definition of.a tao~ limits the scope of the Act 
t, 
1v. The Act does not provide for proceeding..!_gainst anyone other.than the owner, 
ie the demise charterer 
./ v. The Act is not specific as to the exact heads of dam~e which are recoverable 
from the owner 
v1. The Act is ambiguous as to the prescription period for a continuing discharge 
"(@ The scope of application of application of the Act is limited to damage_tltat 
occurs within 12 nautical miles from the low-water mark. It does not take int_g 
c~.ig~rati~m t~t. Sol!t~ Afric,a h~s enforce!!>!~ tjgh.!_s up to 200 nautical miles 
from the low-water mark. 
vu. As has been discussed, if the claimant was able to prove the requirements for 
Aquilian liability, he would be in a more advantageous position to pursue the 
ship-owner or charterer at common law than under Pacoposoa as the ship-
owner or charterer would not be entitled to limit his liability. This defeats the 
whole object of having introduced Pacoposoa. 
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The majority of these short-comings in South African law stem firstly from the 
legislators not introducing the complete text of the "CLC" and secondly from the 
pr9blem of South Africa not keeping pace with the developments in international law. 
As is evident from the paper there is an urgent need to rectify these short-comings in 
South African law. One hopes that the legislators will not wait until South Africa 
suffers its own "EXXON VALDEZ" before they introduce the changes that the law 
so urgently requires. 
X '{) r The . starting point to alleviate the short-comings in South African municipal law 
relating to civil liability for oil pollution damage is t2 introduce the limitation 
· - Y.rovisions al~<?wed under the "Fund Convention" into Pacoposoa. Although South 
Africa is not a party to the Convention, it is submitted that the limitation amounts 
:, 
allowed in terms of the convention are reflective of the modern trend to allow a higher 
limitation fund. As South Africa has ratified the 1984 Protocol to the "CLC", she 
should adopt the limitation provisions contained in the Protocol as soon as the Protocol 
enters into force. 
The second area that requires amendment is the definition of a tanker. There is no 
reason why the provisions of Pacoposoa should not apply to all tankers whether they 
are flagged in a contra,cting state of the ''CLC" or not. The requirement that every 
(e vessel, carrying more than 2 000 tons of oil, requires a certificate of insurance will 
not, as it is now, be meaningless in respect of these tankers. 
The next area that requires amendment is th~ds of damages recoverabl1 from. the 
'l, ship-owner. The A~!. should be specific as to what damages. are recoverable. To have 
to rely upon QOlicy considerations to fall under a head of damage is fraught with 
yroblems. Further the question of locus standi presents a problem to a claimant in 
•- ·-
South African law where the right to bring a public action is not recognised. It is 
§ubrniJ_t~cL!hat in this regard the legislature should adopt the provisions of the U.S. 
FOPA, whicJ1..mecifies the exact nature of damages recoverable from the ship-owner. 
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Pacoposoa should also recognise a right of action against the charterer. As has been 
discussed the demise charterer is in de facto control and possession of the vessel and 
to require the claimant to proceed against the owner only limits the claimant's 
prospects of success. 
, Attention should also be given to extending the scope of application of the Act. If 
there is pollution damage within the Exclusive Fishing Zone that effects the rights of 
any individual then the provisions of Pacoposoa should apply to that damage. 
If these changes are implemented to Pacoposoa then South African law on civil 
liability for oil pollution damage will be in accordance with international law and more 
importantly, an individual in South Africa suffering oil pollution damage will be in 
a better position to recover the full extent of his losses. 
" Further by introducing a higher limit to which the ship-owner may limit his liability 
the ship-owner and the cargo-owner bear more of the costs related to damage resulting 
from oil pollution damage. This, by making the owner pay, will hopefully make him 
more careful in his transportation of oil and thus help prevent the spilling of oil off 
he South African coast. 
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